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TEXTUALISM, THE UNKNOWN IDEAL? 
-
. 
' 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. * 
A MATIER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW. By Antonin Scalia. Princeton, :New Jersey: Princeton Uni­
versity Press. 1997. Pp. xiii, 159. $19.95. 
In May 1997, the New York Knickerbockers basketball team 
was poised to reach the finals of its division in the National Basket­
ball Association (NBA). The Knicks led the rival Miami Heat by 
three games to two and needed one more victory to win the best-of­
seven semifinal playoff series. Game six would be in New York; 
with their star center, Patrick Ewing, playing well, victory seemed 
assured for the Knicks. A fracas during game five changed the 
odds. During a fight under the basket between Knicks and Heat 
players, Ewing left the bench and paced in the middle of the court, 
away from the fight. Rule 12A, Section IX(c), of the NBA Rules 
provided: "During an altercation, all players not participating in 
the game must remain in the immediate vicinity of their bench. Vi­
olators will be suspended, without pay, for a minimum of one 
game," commencing "prior to the start of their next game."1 Ap­
plying the rule, NBA Commissioner David Stem suspended Ewing 
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. M.A. 1974, Harvard; J.D. 1978, Yale. 
- Ed. I received helpful comments from James Brudney, Peter Byrne, Neal Katya!, Mark 
Tushnet, Adrian Vermeule, and other participants at a Georgetown University Law Center 
faculty workshop. Matt Michael provided extremely useful research assistance and can be 
blamed for my generalizations about Generation X law students, see infra note 16. Thanks 
and apologies to Ayn Rand for the title. 
My own complicated biases should be identified at the outset. Although I am something 
of a skeptic, the new textualism is the best thing that has happened to me professionally. The 
casebook for Legislation that Phil Frickey and I developed in the mid-1980s focused strongly 
on statutory interpretation, a then-neglected field. Justice Scalia joined the Court the year 
before our book was published, and the pizzazz he brought to statutory cases not only filled 
up our supplements and the second edition with great cases, but stimulated much greater 
academic as well as public interest in the field. I have published many articles on statutory 
interpretation, the most cited of which is my friendly critique of Scalia's theory. See William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1991). I have loved teaching 
statutory interpretation to students at Georgetown, NYU, Harvard, and Stanford. In the 
1990s, Scalia has been a regular visitor to my Georgetown classes, which is exceedingly gen­
erous of him and great fun for the students. Fmally, there is nothing so enjoyable as teaching 
Scalia's vividly written, intellectually splendid, normatively outraged dissent in Johnson v. 
Santa Clara County Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987), the Title VII affirmative 
action case. 
1. NBA Rule 12A, Section IX(c) reads in full: 
During an altercation, all players not participating in the game must remain in the 
immediate vicinity of the bench. Violators will be suspended, without pay, for a mini­
mum of one game and fined up to $20,000. 
The suspensions will commence prior to the start of their next game. 
1509 
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and another player for game six in New York, which the Knicks 
lost; two other players were suspended for game seven in Miami, 
which the Knicks also lost. Having lost the series, four games to 
three, the Knicks cried foul: the rule should not have been applied 
to Ewing because he did not leave the bench to join the altercation. 
The rule was not intended to apply to Ewing; it was not fair to apply 
the rule to someone who was not contributing to the fight; "we wuz 
robbed." 
The foregoing argument, made not only by the Knicks but also 
in print by philosopher Ronald Dworkin and proceduralist Linda 
Silberman, both law professors at New York University,2 reflects 
good old-fashioned common law reasoning from a rule to a new 
and perhaps unanticipated fact situation.3 Justice Antonin Scalia's 
Tanner Lectures at Princeton University, published with commen­
taries and response by the author as A Matter of Interpretation, say 
humbug to all that. Apply the rule according to its plain meaning. 
Do not consider the "intent" of its drafters.4 Unfairness is irrele­
vant when the rule applies as a matter of plain textual meaning. 
Stem did the right thing and for the right reasons. Ewing must be 
suspended. He and his colleagues will know better than to leave 
the bench during the next melee. 
The statutory analogue to the Case of the Wandering Basketball 
Player is the Case of the Imported Pastor. In Church of the Holy 
Trinity v. United States, 5 the Supreme Court, in 1892, interpreted a 
statute criminally prohibiting anyone from contracting with an 
"alien" to pay his transportation to the United States "to perform 
labor or service of any kind. "6 Although the Church had paid the 
way for The Reverend E. Walpole Warren to come to the United 
States to serve as pastor of its congregation, the Supreme Court 
A team must have a minimum of eight players dressed and ready to play in every 
game. 
If five or more players leave the bench, the players will serve their suspensions alpha­
betically, according to the first letters of their last name[s ]. 
If seven players are suspended (assuming no participants are included), four of them 
would be suspended for the first game following the altercation. The remaining three 
would be suspended for the second game following the altercation. 
NBA OPERATIONS DEPT., OFFICIAL RULES OF THE NATIONAL BASKETBALL AssocIATION, 
1996-1997, at 41 (1996). 
2. See James Traub, Talk of the Town, NEw YORKER, June 2, 1997, at 35 (relating Dwor­
kin's analysis); Linda Silberman, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1997 (Correspondence), at 18. For a 
particularly detailed analysis, see Robert A. Hillman, What the Knicks Debacle of '97 Can 
Teach Students About the Nature of Rules, 47 J. LEG. Eo. 393 (1997). 
3. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 68 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (describing the case of the spoiled heir). 
4. Stem himself drafted the rule, which had been adopted in 1994. Scalia's point would 
be that any NBA adjudicative tribunal should apply the rule without calling up Stem and 
asking, "What did you mean by this rule? Did you have mid-court wanderlust in mind?" 
5. 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
6. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332, 332. 
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created an exception to the statutory prohibition, common law 
style, for Christian ministers and; in dictum, for other "brain toil­
ers." This is the only case discussed in the Tanner Lectures (pp. 18-
23). The Court, argues Scalia, interpreted the law contrary to its 
plain meaning - a minister is performing "labor or service" of 
some kind - in order to fit what the Court considered the statute's 
purpose, or "spirit," as Justice David Brewer's evangelical opinion 
put it (p. 19). Bad. The Court divined the statutory spirit from 
committee reports accompanying the 1885 legislation; the reports 
asserted that the proposed law was only aimed at manual workers 
and not "brain toilers," and the report of the Senate committee la­
mented that the limitation would have been more explicit had there 
been time for amendment (pp. 19-20). Worse. The Court ended its 
exercise with an ode to the United States as a "Christian Nation," 
whose statutes presumptively should not be construed to thwart the 
exercise of religion (pp. 19-20). This is the worst, according to 
Scalia. The Holy Trinity Church Court got the Case of the Im­
ported Pastor as wrong as the law professors got the Case of the 
Wandering Basketball Player wrong. 
More generally, both the Tanner Lectures and Scalia's judicial 
opinions defend a hard-hitting "new textualism"7 as the best, and 
perhaps only, legitimate approach to statutory interpretation. 
Scalia's main point is that a statutory text's apparent plain meaning 
must be the alpha and the omega in a judge's interpretation of the 
statute. The apparent plain meaning is that which an ordinary 
speaker of the English language - twin sibling to the common 
law's reasonable person - would draw from the statutory text. 
This general principle is not original with Scalia; the British House 
of Lords and Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes followed the same idea 
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.8 Yet Scalia's 
theory really is a new textualism. 
Theoretically, Scalia defends his approach based upon a strict 
formal separation of powers: the constitutional role of the legisla­
ture is to enact statutes, not to have intent or purposes, and the role 
of the courts is to apply the words and only the words, without re­
gard to arguments of fairness or political equilibrium (pp. 9-13). 
This constitutional basis for the plain meaning rule gives it greater 
bite and may explain why Scalia tries to find or create a plain mean­
ing for the tersest law. Scalia also invokes institutional reasons for 
his approach, as one which judges are best trained to accomplish 
7. "The new textualism" is my term for statutory Ninoprudence. See Eskridge, supra 
note *. In response to Ronald Dworkin's co=ent on his lecture, Scalia characterizes his 
approach as following the "import" of a statutory text. Seep. 144. 
8. See Vacher & Sons v. London Socy. of Compositors, 1 App. Cas. 107, 121-22 (H.L. 
1912); Hill v. East & West India Dock Co., 9 App. Cas. 448, 464-65 (H.L. 1884); Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARv. L. REv. 417, 419 (1899). 
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and which protects against judicial usurpation. Finally, there is an 
economic dimension to Scalia's thinking: while the temptation to 
do justice ex post in every case is humanly appealing, disciplined 
judges should resist that temptation, because it ex ante sets up 
wasteful, usurpative incentives for everybody else (pp. 36-37). 
Scalia's wedding of formalist, institutionalist, and economic think­
ing in the undertheorized area of statutory interpretation is norma­
tively powerful. 
Doctrinally, the new textualism's most distinctive feature is its 
insistence that judges should almost never consult, and never rely 
on, the legislative history of a statute (pp. 29-37). The rejection of 
legislative history and insistence that judges follow plain meanings 
even when unreasonable contribute to the overall theme of the 
Tanner Lectures: common law approaches, emphasizing purpose, 
policy, and history, are not appropriate for statutory interpretation 
in the modem administrative state (pp. 9-14). Consistent with this 
theme, Scalia has developed a rigorously text-based methodology 
that contrasts strikingly with the common law approach in Holy 
Trinity Church. Like Holmes, the new textualist starts with the 
meaning an ordinary reader would draw from the statutory lan­
guage but delves more deeply than Holmes usually did into what 
other textual sources might teach us. Thus, the Scallan interpreter 
also considers which interpretation is most consistent with the stat­
ute as a whole; whether similar language has been used elsewhere 
in the U.S. Code and, if so, how it has been interpreted; and regular 
rules of grammar, syntax, and word use.9 When textual analysis is 
done thoroughly, it can actually persuade a hostile audience, a feat 
hard to accomplish under other approaches to statutory 
interpretation. 
Rhetorically, Scalia makes the stakes of statutory theory and 
practice well worth thinking and fighting about. The Tanner Lec­
tures ringingly combine an ambitious insistence that statutory inter­
pretation is important for the future of democracy (p. 9) and the 
rule of law (p. 25) with lively critique of the unsystematic way it is 
taught in law schools (pp. 14-15), practiced by attorneys and judges 
(pp. 18-22, 31), and theorized as either reconstructing the probable 
9. This proposition is drawn from Scalia's opinions and not from the Tanner Lectures. 
See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S.380,'404 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Green v. Bock Laun­
dry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). In one 
respect, the Tanner Lectures are potentially misleading. Scalia warns that "[t]o the honest 
textualist, all of these preferential rules and presumptions are a lot of trouble," p. 28, and 
criticizes the substantive canons, pp. 28-29. Yet Scalia himself not only cites but heavily relies 
on these "substantive" canons. See, e.g., United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 
33-34 (1992) (relying on a clear statement rule against waivers of federal sovereign immu­
nity); see also 503 U.S. at 39 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion as bend­
ing the statutory language in ways not supported by precedent or modem policy); supra Part 
IV (providing more extensive analysis of this point). 
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"intent" of the legislature (pp. 16-17) or resolving cases common­
law style, so as to reach the most "desirable result" (pp. 12-13, 21-
22). Scalia suggests that statutory interpretation can again be an 
objective "science" (p. 14) if properly done by honest textualists; 
and that the science of statutory interpretation can assure both de­
mocracy and the rule of law. "What intellectual fun all of this is!" 
(p. 7). 
On the one hand, the new textualism has relatively few defend­
ers in academe (a haven for the contextually inclined),10 is treated 
skeptically and often dismissively by Scalia's colleagues on the 
Court,11 and is appalling to many members of Congress.12 On the 
other hand, Scalia's theory dominates debate about statutory inter­
pretation, is gathering more defenders in academe,13 has one other 
fan on the Court (Justice Thomas) and influences the way all the 
other justices write their opinions and advocates argue their cases 
before the Supreme Court,14 is increasingly popular in the state 
courts and among many federal judges,15 and has a strong allure for 
10. Leading critiques include Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Inter­
preting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992); George A. Costello, Average Voting Members 
and Other "Benign Fictions": The Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, 
and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DuKE L.J. 39 (1990); Daniel A. Farber & 
Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423 (1988); Richard J. 
Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and In­
coherence in the Administrative State, 95 CoLUM. L. REv. 749 (1995); William Popkin, An 
"Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 16 MINN. L. REv. 
1133 (1992); Stephen F. Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 399; 
Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARv. L. REv. 407 (1989); 
Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes 
in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REv. 277 (1990); 
Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDozo 
L. REv. 1597 (1991). 
11. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 n.12 (1993); Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. 
Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610 n.4 (1991). 
12. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). 
13. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, "Plain Meaning": Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict 
Construction, 17 HARv. J.L. & PuB. POLY. 401 (1994); Gregory E. Maggs, The Secret Decline 
of Legislative History: Has Someone Heard a Voice Crying in the Wilderness?, 1994 PuB. INT. 
L. REv. 57; John Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 673 
(1997); Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of Federal Stat­
utes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REv. 827 (1991); Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the 
Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. Cr. REv. 231. 
14. Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 351 (1994). 
15. This is my opinion, drawn from my ten-year participation in the Institute for Judicial 
Administration summer program for state and federal judges. The cross section of judges I 
have met strikes me as much more textualist now than ten years ago. Better evidence for my 
proposition in the text would be a time-series study of decisions in particular state courts or 
federal circuits. This would be a great student Note project. 
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Generation X law students.16 If most scholars and colleagues are 
still skeptical that the new textualism "gets it right," Scalia can 
boast a postmodern triumph: the new textualism has been agenda­
setting and a public relations hit. 
The new textualism is successful primarily because it is familiar 
but simple, on its face neutral and normatively attractive, objective, 
and relatively nonreflexive. Everyone believes that statutory text is 
the starting point for construing statutes, but judges and scholars 
have elaborated upon this familiar rule to create complexities that 
dilute the rule. Scalia takes what is familiar and cuts away the detri­
tus, such as qualifications to plain meaning when plain meaning is 
contrary to legislative intent or purpose or constitutional policy. 
What is left is simplicity itself: when construing statutes, consider 
the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text. Period. This is 
refreshingly easy to understand and would seem to be straightfor­
ward to apply. Because textualism appears relatively easy to apply 
and scientific, it strikes one as more objective and determinate. 
You could tell 100 judges to apply textual plain meaning to a partic­
ular statute, and they would all come back with about the same 
answer - an impossible feat under original intent or more dynamic 
approaches to statutes. This relative determinacy not only renders 
statutory interpretation more neutral, but also subserves both the 
rule of law (we citizens know what is expected of us) and democ­
racy (the legislature can be certain that its statutes will be applied as 
written, not as judges wish they had been written). If this is true, 
then honest textualism is all that judges should be doing in statutory 
interpretation cases. 
This is a serious claim, advanced for the first time in a systematic 
way by the jurist best situated to press it. The gravity of Scalia's 
enterprise and the importance of the issues he poses require a cor­
relative seriousness from academics. Although I have both appreci­
ated and questioned Scalia's new textualism in previous articles, the 
publication of the Tanner Lectures provides me with an opportunity 
to evaluate the new textualism in a more systematic way. This re­
view sets forth several problems that complicate Scalia's important 
and compelling theses. The problems leave me skeptical that the 
bene:f;its he claims for an honest textualism are attainable, but offer 
16. I cannot speak for "all," or "any," Generation X law students, as I am a Baby 
Boomer. Still, I have taught statutory interpretation to more than 1000 students at five dif­
ferent law schools, and that qualifies me to make some generalizations. Many law students 
take to the new textualism like rats to a maze. Even some law students who dislike most of 
the results Scalia reaches find his methodology potentially attractive. Law students particu­
larly enjoy Scalia's cynical attack on legislative history, pp. 31-34. But students also would 
like to be able to have something more objective, at least as lawyers, and Scalia's uncynical 
devotion to text gives them the most objective-sounding approach they are likely to get in 
law school. 
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Scalia and his allied textualists an opportunity to defend their ap­
proach more rigorously. 
Some of the problems are logical ones. Because Scalia's theory 
and much of its appeal are formalist, the theory needs to satisfy 
traditional formalist criteria of coherence and authority. How can 
Scalia's refusal even to consider statutory legislative history square 
with his strong reliance on legislative history in construing the Con­
stitution (the problem of coherence)? By what formal constitu­
tional authority does Scalia support his methodology, especially its 
insistence that legislative history and concepts of equity and reason­
ableness not be considered (the problem of authority)? 
Other problems relate to the primary appeal of formalist 
method, which is that it produces more determinate answers to 
hard questions than squishy functionalist methods. Whether the 
new textualism can deliver on its formalist promise can be tested 
against the example Scalia runs in the Tanner Lectures, Holy Trinity 
Church, and against his own impressive performance on the 
Supreme Court. Are text-based or linguistic sources, such as dic­
tionaries, less manipulable than legislative history (the problem of 
context)? What role do the variegated canons of statutory con­
struction play in a new textualist methodology (the problem of 
loose canons)? 
Yet other problems relate to the claimed neutrality and legiti­
macy of textualist interpretation. The new textualism makes as­
sumptions about the role of courts and justice in our constitutional 
system that should be examined. Is Scalia's attack on legislative 
history properly respectful to the legislature (the problem of de­
mocracy)? Can normative considerations be excluded from statu­
tory cases, even for an honest textualist such as Scalia (the problem 
of normativity)? 
This review shall pose more questions than answers. The con­
crete cases examined, starting with the Case of the Wandering Bas­
ketball Player and the Case of the Imported Pastor and 
supplemented with the Case of the Foreclosure Fire Sale and the 
Case of the Modifying Agency, will be used as templates against 
which to test Scalia's theory and to frame my inquiries. At the end 
of this review, I shall suggest the sort of approach one should take 
with these cases. Although the Tanner Lectures generously tag me 
as endorsing the Supreme Court's traditionally dynamic rather than 
purely textualist approach to statutory interpretation (p. 22), the 
book Scalia cites is one that is normatively critical of the Court's 
dynamism in several lines of cases.17 My prescriptive recommenda­
tions are more pragmatic and critical than dynamic, and in the Case 
17. WILLIAM N. EsKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY lNTERPRETATION 81-105, 107-09, 
139-40, 173, 199-204 (1994). 
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of the Imported Pastor and the Case of the Foreclosure Fire Sale it 
is Scalia who endorses dynamic readings of statutes where I would 
(very reluctantly in the latter case) take a more originalist stance. 
I. THE PROBLEM OF COHERENCE 
Scalia's Tanner Lectures are not just about statutory interpreta­
tion; a brief concluding section criticizes theories of the "Living 
Constitution" (pp. 41-47). The goal of constitutional interpretation, 
Scalia says, is to determine "the original meaning of the text" (p. 
45). Scalia's position on constitutional interpretation - which re­
jects an evolving, au courant Constitution in favor of an originalist, 
stagnant one - is subtly and perhaps just tentatively different from 
his position on statutory interpretation.18 If the former seeks out 
the original meaning of the text, the latter says, with Holmes, "I 
don't care what [the legislature's] intention was. I only want to 
know what the words mean" (pp. 22-23). The former suggests a 
relatively more historicist inquiry, the latter a relatively more lin­
guistic one. To illustrate this potential nuance, contrast Scalia's 
constitutional analysis in his recent opinion for the Court in Printz 
v. United States, 19 which struck down the Brady Act's requirement 
that local law enforcement officers help administer the federal law's 
background checks of gun buyers, with his statutory analysis of the 
imported pastor issue in Holy Trinity Church. 
In Printz, Scalia found "no constitutional text speaking to the 
precise question" of whether the Constitution prohibits the federal 
government from commandeering state or local law enforcement 
officers to help administer a federal statutory scheme. Although 
the normal rule in the absence of a "constitutional text speaking to 
the precise question" is that Congress can regulate issues within its 
constitutional jurisdiction (here, interstate commerce) as it chooses, 
Scalia found a constitutional limitation in "the historical under­
standing and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in 
the jurisprudence of this Court."20 The dead Constitution that 
Scalia describes in the Tanner Lectures came alive in Printz because 
Scalia cobbled together a constitutional limit from several sources: 
historical practice, including early congressional assertions of au­
thority and the debates surrounding the Constitution's ratification; 
the Constitution's overall commitment to the principle of federal­
ism, which would be undermined by national commandeering of 
state and local officials; and the Court's own decision in New York 
18. Ronald Dworkin's comment on the Tanner Lectures says Scalia is a "semantic 
originalist" in statutory cases, but an "expectations originalist" in constitutional ones. P. 119. 
Scalia accepts the distinction more or less. Pp. 144-45. 
19. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). 
20. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370. 
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v. United States,21 which struck down national commandeering of 
state legislatures and which Scalia .e�ended to commandeering of 
local law enforcement officers. 
The contrast between Scalia's methodology in Printz and his 
analysis of Holy Trinity Church is striking and can be generalized. 
To begin with, text plays a different role in the two cases. It is the 
primary and perhaps even exclusive focus in the statutory case, but 
only a secondary and indirect focus in the constitutional case. This 
is characteristic of Scalia's approach in other cases as well. In 
Scalia's approach to issues of constitutional federalism22 or separa­
tion of powers,23 there is usually little or no analysis of specific con­
stitutional provisions but much emphasis on general principles 
drawn from the overall structure of the document and its history. 
This is not so far from the spirit analysis that Brewer deployed in 
Holy Trinity Church, the case in which Scalia insists that the Court 
should have stuck to the plain meaning of the provision in question. 
In statutory cases, Scalia is dismissive of appeals to statutory pur­
pose and requires parties to demonstrate a clear text on point 
before he will deliver the goods. Tue different role of text for Scalia 
in constitutional and statutory cases can be defended on the ground 
that the Constitution is a short document mostly drafted two centu­
ries ago, while statutes are more recent and usually much more de­
tailed. Hence, in the latter cases there is more likely to be text on 
point. But this defense is in tension with Scalia's belief that the 
Constitution should not evolve to fulfill abstract principles, and 
with his view that judicial discretion must be limited by confining 
judges to the application of plain meanings, not spongy spirits. 
Additionally, Scalia's inquiry in Printz and other constitutional 
cases is strongly historical: What did this text signify to people of 
the time? The Tanner Lectures' analysis of Holy Trinity Church, 
which construed a statute enacted more than 100 years ago, is ahis­
torical and shows no interest in what the statutory command, not to 
import aliens for "labor or service of any kind," would have meant 
to the people of the time against the backdrop of early national 
21. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
22. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376-78; Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 
(1996); U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); West 
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in p� and dis­
senting in part). Although Scalia did not author the Seminole majority opinion or the U.S. 
Term Limits dissent, he joined both opinions and they reflect his approach. On the other 
hand, it is noteworthy that Scalia did not join that part of the Court's opinion in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164-66 (1997), that discussed the drafting history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See 117 S. Ct. at 2159. 
23. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995); Lujan v. Defenders of Wtld­
life, 504 U.S. 505 (1992); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissent­
ing); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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immigration policy. In fact, there is reason to think that some ordi­
nary speakers of the English language would have limited the statu­
tory language to manual workers and would not have extended it to 
brain toilers such as the Holy Trinity Church pastor. The first defi­
nition of the term "labor" listed in the 1879 and 1886 editions of 
Webster's Dictionary was "Physical toil or bodily exertion . . .  hard 
muscular effort directed to some useful end, as agriculture, manu­
factures, and the like . . . .  "24 The first, and preferred, definition 
supports Brewer's intuition that brain toilers were not targeted by 
the statute (although Brewer cheerfully conceded that statutory 
plain meaning cut against his view!). The second listed definition, 
"intellectual exertion, mental effort,"25 was broad enough to in­
clude brain as well as manual toilers, but judges of the period were 
more likely to follow the primary definition. In the 1880s, judges 
interpreting the laws and treaties excluding Chinese "laborers" or 
persons brought over for "labor" held that the terms should be read 
in their primary popular senses, to mean "physical labor for another 
for wages," and therefore not to include actors, teachers, or 
merchants. 26 
The contemporary definition of "service" was also narrow. 
Webster's first, and only relevant, definition of the term was: "The 
act of serving; the occupation of a servant; the performance of labor 
for the benefit of another, or at another's command; attendance of 
an inferior, or hired helper, or slave, &c., on a superior, employer, 
master, or the like . . .. "27 Legal dictionaries of the period defined 
"service" more broadly, as "being employed to serve another; duty 
or labor to be rendered by one person to another."28 When lawyers 
spoke of professional work, they appear to have used the term 
"services" rather than "service."29 
If contemporaries saw "labor or service of any kind" to be phys­
ical and helper work, as these sources suggest, Scalia has less cause 
24. NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 745 
(Chauncey A. Goodrich & Noah Porter, eds., rev. ed. 1879). The 1886 edition had precisely 
the same definitions for all the words discussed in this review. 
25. Id. The now-authoritative Black's Law Dictionary, published shortly after the statute 
was executed, focused on the first meaning. See HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A DICTIONARY 
OF LAW 682 (1891) (defining labor to mean "[w]ork; toil; service. Continued exertion, of the 
more onerous and inferior kind, usually and chiefly consisting in the protracted expenditure 
of muscular force"). 
26. See In re Ho King, 14 F. 724 (D. Or. 1883); State v. Rush, 55 Wis. 465 {1882); see also 
Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 8-11, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 
{1892) (No. 143) {discussing cases construing "laborer" or "labor"). 
27. WEBSTER, supra note 24, at 1206. The other definitions, including "spiritual obedi· 
ence and love," were not relevant to employment. 
28. BLACK, supra note 25, at 1083; see also BOUVIER'S LAW DICTIONARY (1868). 
29. See, e.g., United States v. Langston, 118 U.S. 389, 390 {1886) (referring to "services" 
rendered by public officials); Boyd v. Gorman, 157 N.Y. 365, 365 {1898) (referring to lawyer's 
"services"). 
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to reject the result in Holy Trinity Church.30 What is significant is 
that Scalia was not interested enough in contemporary understand­
ing to "look it up."31 While he has shown such interest in some 
statutory cases,32 Scalia often devotes little or no effort to figuring 
out how contemporaries actually would have understood the terms 
used in statutes. 
The biggest discontinuity between Scalia's constitutional and 
statutory analysis is the role of legislative history. The most doctri­
nally distinctive feature of his statutory jurisprudence is its sweep­
ing rejection of legislative history. Scalia considers the legislative 
discussion prior to a statute's enactment not only subordinate to the 
statutory text, but not even worthy of consideration. If Scalia were 
persuaded that "labor or service of any kind" semantically meant 
only manual or helper work, he would concur in the judgment 
reached by Brewer in Holy Trinity Church. But he would write sep­
arately, insisting that the legislative history have no role in deciding 
or even discussing the issue of the imported pastor. In §tatutory 
cases, Scalia will often concur only in the judgment because he re­
jects the majority opinion's use of legislative history.33 In the 1996 
Term, he went so far as to refuse to join a footnote of an opinion 
that merely explained why "[w]e give no weight to the legislative 
history. "34 
Contrast this stance with Scalia's constitutional opinions, which 
generally, and sometimes extensively, discuss the debating history 
of the Constitution. In Printz, for example, Scalia's opinion care­
fully considered and vigorously disputed the dissenters' deployment 
of The Federalist to support their view that the Brady Act provision 
in question was constitutional because the framers and everybody 
else assumed that the federal government did have the power to 
30. Scalia can still object that "labor or service of any kind" should be broader than 
simple "labor," including the brain toilers who also, literally, do work, as well as the sweat 
toilers who were the usual objects of the term. The Tanner Lectures, however, denounce 
"literalism" almost as much as they denounce evolutive constructions. Pp. 23-24. 
31. The Church made this kind of definitional argument in its brief. The United States 
did not challenge the definitions. Compare Brief for Plaintiff in Error, 11-13, Holy Trinity, 
143 U.S. 4S7 (discussing the dictionary and judicial definitions of labor and service) with 
Brief for Defendant in Error, Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. 4S7 (providing no response). 
32. E.g., Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), 116 S. Ct. 1730, 173S-36 (1996). 
33. See Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 116 S. Ct. 637, 64S (1996) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, SlO 
U.S. 200, 219 {1994) {Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); Comoy v. Aniskoff, 
S07 U.S. Sll, S18 {1993) {Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); United States v. Thompson/ 
Center Arms Co., S04 U.S. SOS, S19 {1992) {Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Sullivan v. 
Fmkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); Green v. Bock Laundry 
Mach. Co., 490 U.S. S04, S27 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Blanchard v. 
Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in the judgment); INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 4S2 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
34. See Associates Co=ercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 n.* {1997) (noting 
that Scalia joins the entire opinion except footnote 4). 
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deploy state officials to carry out federal statutory schemes.35 
Scalia's opinion also' affirmatively relied on The Federalist to estab­
lish that the Constitution was meant to prohibit such deployment, 
both as specifically understood by at least one framer, Madison,36 
and as generally understood from the constitutional principle -
spirit? - of dual sovereignty.37 Printz is a high-water point for 
Scalia's use of The Federalist because specific constitutional texts -
the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, the 
Supremacy Clause - on the whole support the dissenters and have 
to be explained away. Nonetheless, Scalia in other opinions has re­
lied on The Federalist to support his constitutional constructions.38 
The Federalist was a series of propaganda documents penned by 
supporters of the Constitution to persuade New York to ratify it.39 
They are distinguishable from legislative history, of the sort in­
voked in Holy Trinity Church, insofar as they were written by 
smarter and more far-sighted people, but they are on the whole less 
reliable sources for figuring out "the objective indication of the 
words, rather than the intent of the [framers]" (p. 29). All of 
Scalia's criticisms of legislative history apply to The Federalist: the 
essays are not the "words" of the law, they take positions on issues 
that the drafters of the Constitution did not think about, and they 
were read by neither the drafters nor the delegates ratifying the 
Constitution outside New York (pp. 29-33). To Scalia's criticisms 
should be added another: because they were written 200 years ago, 
and because the Constitution and the nation have decisively 
evolved in ways the authors did not anticipate, The Federalist essays 
operate upon assumptions that long ago died. 
How can a jurist who detests statutory legislative history rely on 
constitutional legislative history that is, if anything, less reliable? 
The only defense I have ever heard from Scalia is that he does not 
consider The Federalist "authoritative" in the same way the Court 
has traditionally considered legislative history. This strikes me as 
little more than a word game. Scalia and other constitutional 
originalists use The Federalist as evidence of how a few of the fram­
ers explained the purposes and some of the specific understandings 
of the Constitution and particular provisions. For the most part, 
judges have used statutory legislative history in the same way or as 
35. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2373-74 (1997). 
36. Hamilton may have had a similar understanding, but Scalia dismisses him as an out­
lier on this issue. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2374-75, 2375 n.9. 
37. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376-79 (invoking The Federalist ten times and quoting the 
documents four times in determining the "essential postulate[s]" of the Constitution). 
38. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-99 (1988) {Scalia, J., dissenting). 
39. On the essays as propaganda and the problems with generalizing from them to repre­
sent objective meaning or subjective intent, see ARTHUR FuRTWANGLER, THE AUTHORITY 
OF PuBLIUS: A READING OF THE FEDERALIST p APERS {1984). 
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confirmatory evidence of what the text apparently means; and most 
of this century's major theories of statutory interpretation have ap­
proached legislative history as evidence, not as authority.40 
Although many users of legislative history call it "authoritative" ev­
idence, The Federalist is authoritative in the same sense: if those 
essays had been private letters by Thomas Jefferson (a brilliant man 
and learned theorist, but not a framer of the Constitution), they 
would not have the same cachet as public defenses by James 
Madison (the note-taker at the Philadelphia Convention) and 
Alexander Hamilton (a once and future leading Federalist). No 
Justice or leading theoretician has, to my knowledge, confused stat­
utory history (at best, authoritative evidence of legal meaning) with 
statutory text (legal authority). Scalia's Supreme Court colleague, 
Stephen Breyer, has thoughtfully justified legislative history consid­
eration along these lines.41 
Thus, it would appear that a jurist can and should consult both 
The Federalist and statutory legislative history, for what they are 
worth, in figuring out constitutional or statutory meaning. There is 
insufficient reason to consider only one and not the other, unless 
one can defend materially different approaches as to constitutional 
interpretation and statutory interpretation. Such an argument is 
possible,42 but it would present different kinds of trouble. Scalia 
charges that the use of statutory legislative history augments judicial 
discretion to read statutes willfully rather than lawfully (p. 36). If 
that were so, the use of constitutional debating history is more dan­
gerous, especially when the Court uses it, as in Printz, to create a 
constitutional limitation not apparent from the plain language of 
the Constitution (and arguably at odds with the Supremacy Clause). 
Congress can, and often does, override willful judicial constructions 
of statutes, but it usually cannot override willful judicial construc­
tions of the Constitution. If judicial activism (substituting judicial 
results for legislative ones) is presumptively suspect, as the Tanner 
Lectures assume, then it is the constitutional and not the statutory 
interpreter who should be especially chary of relying on debating 
history. "Harold Leventhal used to say, the trick [in using legisla­
tive history] is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out 
your friends" (p. 36). That is precisely the charge made by the 
Printz dissenters against Scalia's deployment of The Federalist and 
other background evidence to create a constitutional limit on the 
40. See EsKRIDGE, supra note 17, ch. 7; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Val­
ues, 66 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 365 (1992). 
41. See Breyer, supra note 10. 
42. I suggest some arguments along these and other lines in Textualism and Original In­
tent: Should the Supreme Court Consult the Federalist Papers but not Statutory Legislative 
History?, _ GEo. WASH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1998). 
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national government where none appears on the face of the 
Constitution. 43 
Indeed, the debating history would seem more relevant for re­
cently enacted statutes, where the legislative expectations relate to 
a world we know and sometimes address issues still alive, than for 
the grand old Constitution, where the expectations relate to a world 
we know only through a glass darkly and address issues typically 
dead or altered by circumstances. This point has a substantive di­
mension. Debating history or general background surrounding the 
Constitution adds context that is substantively slanted, not just to­
ward the values of federalism in ways that the Reconstruction 
Amendments sought to offset, but also systematically against the 
interests of people of color (constitutional slaves in 1789), women 
(legal servants), poor people (nonvoters), and religious and social 
nonconformists (social outcasts), in ways that subsequent amend­
ments and judicial constructions have sought to ameliorate. The 
context of constitutional debating history is slanted in a conserva­
tive direction much more so than the debating history of federal 
statutes, most of which were enacted by Democratic Congresses 
and therefore slanted too, but in a more regulatory-state direction. 
In short, a generously purpose-oriented historicist interpretation of 
the Constitution and an ungenerous approach to statutes are most 
obviously (but perhaps superficially) reconciled as a politically con­
servative move by courts. If this were the best explanation, it would 
be a disturbing feature of the new textualism's incoherent treat­
ment of constitutional and statutory debating history. If much of 
the appeal of the new textualism is its neutrality and its aspiration 
to eliminate all judicial activism, then any substantive slant is 
worrisome. 
II. THE PROBLEM OF AUTHORITY 
Scalia is an out-of-the-closet formalist (p. 25). He therefore 
must have a theory by which the Constitution - the ultimate 
source of formal authority for a federal judge - authorizes or, even 
better, requires the new textualism as a methodology. Does the 
Constitution require, encourage, or permit the new textualist ap­
proach to statutory interpretation? There is nothing in the text of 
the Constitution that requires judges to interpret statutes according 
to their plain meanings. The "judicial Power" that Article III grants 
to the Supreme Court and to inferior federal courts poses rather 
43. See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2387-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2401-04 
(Souter, J., dissenting). Even some conservative scholars who take original intent seriously 
and who firmly believe in federalism have found insufficient historical support to extend New 
York's rule against co=andeering state legislatures, see supra note 21 and accompanying 
text, to Printz's rule against co=andeering state law enforcement officers. See, e.g., Sai 
Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1957 (1993). 
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than answers the question: What does "judicial Power" mean? In 
statutory cases, would such power include only textual readings, or 
would it include something more? 
To answer these questions about the meaning of "judicial 
Power," an interpreter following Scalia's approach to constitutional 
interpretation, as articulated in Printz and other decisions, would 
consider eighteenth-century practice, constitutional principle and 
structure, and the ratifying debates. These sources provide more 
support for a common law, equitable approach to statutory inter­
pretation than for a strict, Scalian textualism. The following discus­
sion is preliminary rather than definitive and invites further 
scholarly inquiry. My tentative conclusions are the following: (1) 
the goal of statutory interpretation was understood to implement 
the "intent" of the legislature; (2) intent was derived from the statu­
tory text, the spirit or purpose of the statute, precedent, the com­
mon law and canons of statutory construction, and ideas of equity 
and reasonableness; (3) statutory text, including the whole statute, 
was on the whole the most important evidence of intent, but the 
common law and equity exercised strong influence on how courts 
read text; ( 4) it was sometimes acceptable for courts to depart from 
the letter of a statute, in deference to its spirit, practice, or princi­
ples; (5) legislative history, generally not available in published 
form, was not discussed one way or the other; and ( 6) the framers 
would have been receptive to Brewer's mode of analysis in Holy 
Trinity Church, with a possible exception for a reading of his opin­
ion that emphasized specific, subjective intent rather than general, 
objective intent. 
A. Constitutional Background: Eighteenth-Century Statutory 
Theory and Practice 
In determining what import the Framers would have given to 
"judicial Power" in statutory cases, one might start with then­
contemporary practice, as Scalia did in Printz. The leading legal 
treatise discussing statutory interpretation was Blackstone's Com­
mentaries, considered almost as authoritative in the colonies and 
new states as it was in the United Kingdom.44 Blackstone certainly 
believed that statutory text was important - as the best but not the 
only evidence of legislative intent.45 Following traditional English 
practice, Blackstone said that "the most universal and effectual way 
of discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubi­
ous, is by considering the reason and spirit of it . . . for when this 
44. See William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and 
Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. RE.v. 799, 803 {1985). 
45. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *59-*62, *91. See also Blatt, supra 
note 44, at 802-05. 
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reason ceases, the law itself ought likewise to cease with it."46 This 
"mischief rule" paid due regard to statutory plain meaning but em­
phasized statutory purpose, or "spirit." Blackstone also recognized 
that, as time passed, statutes would be applied to new circumstances 
not contemplated by the legislature. 
For, since in laws all cases cannot be foreseen or expressed, it is neces­
sary that when the general decrees of the law come to be applied to 
particular cases, there should be somewhere a power vested of defin­
ing those circumstances which (had they been foreseen) the legislator 
himself would have expressed.47 
Note the focus on legislative intent. In such cases, he urged judges 
"to expound the statute by equity" and to reject unreasonable con­
sequences "where some collateral matter arises out of the general 
words" of the statute.48 Blackstone's willingness to leave room for 
spirit-based, equitable constructions is closer to Brewer's rather 
than Scalia's approach in Holy Trinity Church, and his collateral 
matter rule seems tailored to Holy Trinity Church. 
Blackstone was not the only background context for the fram­
ers. In his comment on the Tanner Lectures, historian Gordon 
Wood says that the American states were reconceptualizing the ju­
diciary between 1776 and 1789 (pp. 49-63). The statutory decisions 
of state courts are relevant to figuring out what "judicial Power" 
meant to an American audience in 1789. I read most, if not all, of 
the published state court statutory interpretation decisions of the 
1780s and 1790s from Connecticut, Delaware, New Jersey, North 
Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. In light of Wood's statement, 
I was surprised at how consistent practice in those states was with 
Blackstonian precepts. Consider Executors of Barree/if! v. Admin­
istrator of Griscom.49 Plaintiff obtained a judgment for £74 10s; af­
ter failure of complete payment, plaintiff won a second judgment 
for the £45 6s 2d balance. The issue was whether plaintiff was enti­
tled to costs on the second action. A 1782 statute gave costs in "any 
suit for any debt or demand" when the judgment was £50 or more, 
but an 1847-48 statute provided for costs in "any suit, or action 
whatsoever" where the sum sought was more than £15. The New 
Jersey Supreme Court in 1793 framed the inquiry as "guided by the 
designs and intentions of the legislature, so far as they are to be 
46. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *61; see also Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 
(Ex. 1584) (urging judges "to make such construction [of the act] as shall suppress the mis­
chief and advance the remedy"). Heydon's Case was a leading English authority whose mis­
chief rule is discussed approvingly in 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *87. 
47. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at *62. 
48. Id. at *91. See also College of Physician's (Dr. Bonham's) Case, 123 Eng. Rep. 928 
(C.P. 1609). Bonham's Case was an authority well known to eighteenth-century American 
jurists. See Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and Judicial Review, 40 liARv. L. REv. 
30 (1926). 
49. 1 N.J.L. 193 (1793). 
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gathered from the expressions they have employed."50 Thus, like 
Blackstone, the court saw statutory text as part of an intentionalist 
enterprise. More strikingly, the court avoided the plain meaning of 
the 1782 statute - which would seem to deny plaintiff costs in the 
second action - by Blackstonian precepts which created an excep­
tion for "superior" actions to enforce judgments: (1) the equitable 
policy of the earlier statute and its applicability to narrow the sec­
ond; (2) the principle that a generally phrased statute can be nar­
rowed when applied to unanticipated fact situations; and (3) the 
"inconveniences" that would arise from not giving plaintiff its costs 
in the second action.51 The court's ultimate articulation of its hold­
ing was hardly textualist: "as we are not compelled by the letter 
and perhaps spirit of the acts to adopt such [an inconvenient] con­
struction, we are of opinion that they do not apply to this case and 
that the plaintiff recover his full costs."52 
Although several of the decisions from this period did seem to 
follow a simple plain meaning approach to statutory interpreta­
tion,53 the typical statement of the interpretive task was this: 
We do not consider ourselves bound by the strictly grammatical con­
struction of the words of the act. The intention of the legislature 
should be our guide, or, rather, in a case of this nature, we should not 
hesitate to adopt a construction which the words will clearly warrant, 
free from those inconveniences which must flow from any other 
interpretation.54 
Although the statutory interpreter at the time of the framing cer­
tainly paid close attention to statutory text, he read the text in light 
of the Blackstonian ideas that statutes should be narrowly con­
strued when they run up against common law presumptions,55 
should be construed by reference to their spirits or purposes,56 and 
50. 1 NJ.L. at 194. 
51. See 1 NJ.L. at 195. 
52. 1 NJ.L. at 196. 
53. See Jones v. Stokes, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 25 (1796) (adopting a literalist interpretation; in­
clusio unius); Gregory v. Bray, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 29 (1796). 
54. Woodbridge v. Amboy, 1 NJ.L. 213, 214 (1794); see also Elliott v. Richards, 1 Del. 
Cas. 87 (C.P. 1796). 
55. See Smith v. Minor, 1 NJ.L. 16 (1790) (adopting, in dictum; the rule of lenity); WIStar 
v. Kammerer, 2 Yeates 100 (Pa. 1796) (advocating a narrow construction of a statute so as not 
to affect property rights); Vanhome's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 317 (1795) 
(same); Paine v. Ely, D. Chip. 37, 39-40 (Vt. 1789) (observing that statutes creating unusual 
jurisdiction are to be narrowly construed); Chichester v. Vass, 5 Va. (1 Call) 82, 92-102 (1797). 
Compare White v. Hunt, 6 NJ.L. 415, 417-18 (1798) (Kinsey, C.J.) (advocating a rule against 
retrospective application) with 6 NJ.L. at 419 (Kirkpatrick, J.) (interpreting words "consis­
tent with reason and equity"). 
56. See Warder v. Arell, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 282, 299 (Va. 1796) (Carrington, J.) (rejecting 
"strict rules of grammatical construction" in favor of "the spirit, as well as the just exposition 
of the words of the law"); Grant's Lessee v. Eddy, 2 Yeates 147 (Pa. 1796) (adopting a purpo­
sive approach); Hancock v. Hovey, 1 N.C. (Tay.) 104 (1799) (advocating an exception to 
statutory plain meaning where suggested by "mischief' or "spirit" inquiries and advocating 
1526 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 96:1509 
can sometimes be interpreted contrary to their apparent plain 
meaning, when that is in tension with great principles.57 
For an example of the last point, consider Bracken v. Visitors of 
William and Mary College. 58 The Virginia Court of Appeals in that 
case allowed the governing board of William and Mary to eliminate 
the chair of grammar, which had been specifically mandated in the 
decree creating the college. The Court acceded to the position 
urged by William and Mary's counsel, John Marshall, who argued 
that the primary intent of the authorizing statutes was to delegate 
policymaking discretion to the Visitors and that changed circum­
stances justified the Visitors' adoption of a plan contrary to some of 
the details of the original statutory grant. "It was proper that this 
discretion should be given to the Visitors, because a particular 
branch of science, which at one period of time would be deemed all 
important, might at another, be thought not worth acquiring," ar­
gued Marshall. "In institutions, therefore, which are to be durable, 
only great leading and general principles ought to be immutable. "59 
B. Constitutional Implication from Bicameralism 
and Presentment 
Although he does not consider judicial practice and contempo­
rary understanding of what "judicial Power" meant in statutory 
cases, Scalia does defend his approach as required by constitutional 
principle. Specifically, he argues that the new textualism is sup­
ported by Article I, Section 7's requirement that a bill does not be­
come a statute unless it has been accepted in the same textual form 
by both Houses of Congress and presented to the President (pp. 34-
35). Because only the statutory text actually becomes law, any un­
written intentions of one house or of one committee or of one 
member in Congress are not law unless it can be shown that they 
were understood and accepted by both houses and by the President. 
According to Scalia, relying on committee reports to determine a 
statute's meaning is analogous to lawmaking by congressional sub-
implicit judicial notice of legislative deliberation); Watson & Hartshorne v. Alexander, 1 Va. 
(1 Wash.) 340 (1794) (asserting that courts should reconcile textual plain meaning and eq­
uity); Wallace v. Taliaferro, 6 Va. (2 Call) 445, 456-90 (1800) (similar). 
57. See Anderson's Admrs. v. Anderson, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 3 (1789) (rejecting plain meaning 
to achieve an equitable result); Hall v. Feild, 1 Del. Cas. 54 (1795) (asserting that the practice 
under the statute at issue required departure from plain meaning); Woodbridge v. Amboy, 1 
NJ.L. at 213 (asserting fairness reasons for applying a 1740 statute retroactively). 
58. 7 Va. (3 Call) 573 (1790). 
59. Bracken, 7 Va. (3 Call) at 581. For an argument that Marshall was more textualist as 
Chief Justice, see John Choon Yoo, Note, Marshall's Plan: The Early Supreme Court and 
Statutory Interpretation, 101 YALE L.J. 1607 (1992). Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (3 
Cranch) 137 (1803) (applying an untextualist approach to construing the Judiciary Act of 
1789); Hamilton v. Russell, 5 U.S. (3 Cranch) 309, 318 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) (applying statu­
tory construction to promote the "intent of the statute"). 
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groups,60 which the Court found unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 
the legislative veto case.61 
Scalia is right that the Court should not consider legislative 
background materials to have the authority of law; indeed, no jus­
tice or serious scholar advances that proposition. In pressing the 
argument to deny the relevance of legislative materials to the inter­
pretation of statutes, Scalia reads too much into the bicameralism 
and presentment requirements, however. Chadha, itself quoting a 
Senate committee report, held that the bicameralism and present­
ment requirements are only formally applicable when "actions 
taken by either House . . .  'contain matter which is properly to be 
regarded as legislative in its character and effect"' - namely, to 
alter legal rights and duties. 62 That is precisely the effect of the 
legislative veto invalidated in Chadha. In contrast, committee re­
ports consulted to explain the meaning of the statute do not them­
selves alter legal rights and duties. Judicial consideration of 
committee reports does not violate bicameralism or presentment 
any more than would a judge's consulting a dictionary. Chadha 
made this point and emphasized that bicameralism and present­
ment are only limitations on Congress' actions - the requirements 
are in Article I - and not the actions of branches of government 
regulated by Articles II and III. Bicameralism is formally irrelevant 
as a limitation on subsequent implementation and interpretation of 
legislation. 63 
Even principle (or spirit) derived from Article I, Section 7 is 
unlikely to support the new textualism. The purpose of the bicam­
eralism requirement, according to Chadha, is "[t]he division of the 
Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the legislative 
power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and 
60. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part); 
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452-53 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History (delivered during fall 1985 and spring 
1986 at various law schools; transcript distributed by the Virginia Law Review). 
61. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
62. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952 (quoting S. REP. No. 54-1335, at 8 (1897)). 
63. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.116. This footnote addresses administrative "lawmak-
ing" and observes that 
[e]xecutive action under legislatively delegated authority that might resemble 'legisla­
tive' action in some respects is not subject to the approval of both Houses of Congress 
and the President for the reason that the Constitution, . . .  [namely, Article II, which 
describes the President's powers] does not so require. That kind of Executive action is 
always subject to check by the terms of the legislation that authorized it; and if that 
authority is exceeded it is open to judicial review as well as the power of Congress to 
modify or revoke the authority entirely. A one-House veto is clearly legislative in both 
character and effect and is not so checked; the need for the check provided by Art. I, 
§§ 1, 7, is therefore clear. 
This same analysis could be applied to judicial interpretation of statutes. 
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debate in separate settings."64 The Constitution's contemplation of 
deliberative discussion in the legislature suggests an implicit toler­
ance for reviewing those deliberations on the part of those charged 
with interpreting and implementing the legislation. Indeed, 
Madison said as much in Federalist 47: "The judges can exercise no 
executive prerogative, though they are shoots from the executive 
stock; nor any legislative function, though they may be advised with 
by the legislative councils," by which Madison meant subgroups or 
committees of Congress.65 To the extent that committee reports 
and other legislative history shed light on the "study and debate" in 
which Congress is supposed to engage, the constitutional proce­
dures of legislation would seem to support some consultation of leg­
islative history. 
It can be argued that any formal delegation by Congress of law­
explication authority to congressional committees would be in dero­
gation of Article I, Section 7, as interpreted in Chadha and Bowsher 
v. Synar. 66 That kind of argument would, at most, caution against 
judicial treatment of "subsequent legislative history" as authorita­
tive in any way but, again, does not speak directly to judicial prac­
tice or even to committees' generating reports that they hope will 
influence judicial construction of statutes. 
C. Constitutional Principle and Debating History: Separation 
of Powers 
Scalia draws from the Constitution's separation of powers in Ar­
ticles I-III the precepts that Congress should do all of the lawmak­
ing and the Court as little as possible - unless explicitly and 
broadly delegated by Congress, as in the Sherman Act. According 
to the new textualists, consideration of legislative history creates 
greater opportunities for the exercise of judicial discretion, thereby 
enhancing the risk that the Court will exercise its own "WILL in­
stead of JUDGMENT," effectively "substitut[ing] [its own] plea­
sure to that of the legislative body."67 A focus on the text alone, in 
contrast, is a more concrete inquiry that will better constrain the 
tendency of judges to substitute their will for that of Congress. 
64. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981) (emphasis 
added). 
66. 478 U.S. 714 (1986); see Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abate­
ment of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252 (1991). The argument in the text is made at some 
length in Manning, supra note 13. Manning does not follow Scalia in arguing for exclusion of 
legislative history; he mainly argues that it should not be considered authoritative. 
67. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 65, at 230 (Hamilton); see also Public Citizen v. 
U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 471 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting 
THE FEDERALIST No. 78). 
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The premise of Scalia's position - that separation of powers 
denies the Court any law-affecting function - is at odds with the 
way at least some framers understood the import of the Constitu­
tion. By separating the power to enact statutes (Article I) from the 
power to enforce (Article II) or interpret (Article III) statutes, the 
Constitution contemplates not just a separation of powers, but also 
a cooperation of different power centers. That is, the constitutional 
scheme sets up a structure where ongoing policy creation will be 
interactive and dynamic rather than unitary and static. The framers 
created separate branches within the federal government, in part to 
ensure that no one branch would create law and control policy by 
itself. Madison argued in Federalist 47 that tyranny is more likely if 
state power is concentrated in one department.68 In Federalist 51, 
he maintained that segregating different lawmaking functions -
enactment, enforcement, interpretation - protects liberty because 
ambition is made to counter ambition.69 For this reason, branches 
that are separate can still have some "partial agency in" or "control 
over" one another, and Madison saw the nature of those powers as 
mutually encroaching, setting up a friendly competition among am­
bitious officials seeking to protect the public good as the best way 
to preserve their own authority.70 If one body (Congress) enacts 
the laws, another institution (the Presidency) implements them, and 
yet another (the Court) interprets them, then it is less likely that 
tyrannical or unfair policies will result. This philosophy does not 
insist that courts do nothing but apply textual plain meanings. 
The framers of the Constitution were at least as pragmatic as 
Blackstone in their approach to statutes, and it appears that one 
specific reason for separating the enactment of statutes from their 
interpretation is the framers' belief in the productivity of common 
law, equitable interpretation like that defended by Blackstone. 
This was the point of John Marshall's argument in Bracken, that the 
governing board have freedom to create new rules "according to 
their various occasion and circumstances, as to them should seem 
most fit and expedient," limited only by "the great outlines marked 
in the charter."71 The Anti-Federalist opponents of the Constitu­
tion were critical of Article Ill's assurance of judicial independence 
68. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 65, at 139-42 (Madison) (quoting and relying 
on Charles Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, book XI, ch. VI (1748)). 
69. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 65 (Madison). 
70. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 65, at 140 (Madison); see also THE FEDERAL­
IST No. 73 (Hamilton) (offering a similar rationale supporting the presidential veto); THE 
FEDERALIST No. 78 (Hamilton) (offering a similar rationale supporting judicial nullification 
or melioration of "partial and unjust" statutes); see generally DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE POLIT­
ICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 130-31 (1984). 
71. See Bracken v. VISitors of William and Mary College, 7 Va. (3 Call) 573, 580 (1790) 
(reporting Marshall's argument). 
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for precisely this reason: following Blackstone, federal courts 
would apply the spirit and not the letter of the Constitution in ways 
that neither the states nor even Congress could correct.72 The Anti­
Federalist objection was usually to judicial review, but The Federal 
Farmer in particular argued that unelected judges posed a threat to 
liberty and state authority through their interpretation of statutes as 
well.73 
Alexander Hamilton's Federalist 78 responded to these attacks; 
like his opponents, Hamilton focused on judicial review but treated 
statutory interpretation as well. He followed Blackstone in believ­
ing that courts should not only interpret statutes equitably, but 
might also respond to "unjust and partial laws" by "mitigating the 
severity and confining the operation of such laws."74 Hamilton's 
reasoning was that interpretive curtailment of unjust laws would 
force the legislature to "qualify" the severity of statutes it enacted, 
knowing them to be subject to further review. " [N]o man can be 
sure that he may not be tomorrow the victim of a spirit of injustice 
by which he may be a gainer today," and "every man must now feel 
that the inevitable tendency of such a spirit is to sap the foundations 
of public and private confidence. "75 
Federalist 78 recognized the danger of "the substitution of 
uudges'] pleasure to that of the legislative body." Like the Anti­
Federalists, Hamilton saw his as mainly a problem for judicial re­
view and not for statutory interpretation.76 Responding to the 
Anti-Federalist fears of unconstrained judges, Hamilton argued 
that courts were constrained in their interpretation of statutes. His 
argument was not that statutory interpreters are constrained by the 
plain meaning of statutory texts - which Hamilton never men­
tioned - but instead by "strict rules and precedents";77 by the pur­
pose of an independent judiciary "to secure a steady, upright, and 
72. See Brutus XI, N.Y.J., Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in FEDERALISTS AND ANTIFEDERAL­
ISTS: THE DEBATE OVER TiiE RATIFICATION oF THE CoNsTITUTioN 121, 123-24 (John P. 
Kaminski & Richard Leffler eds., 1989); Brutus XV, N.Y.J., Mar. 20, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 437 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
73. See Federal Fanner XV, N.Y.J., Jan. 18, 1788, reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE ANT1-
FEDERALIST, supra note 72, at 315-16. 
74. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 65, at 231 (Hamilton); see also DAVID F. 
EPSTEIN, PoLmCAL THEORY OF TiiE FEDERALIST 188-90 (arguing that Hamilton was sug­
gesting that "courts may be lenient against the lawmakers' intention" and that the framers 
generally endorsed an equity-based approach to statutory interpretation). 
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 65, at 232; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 73 
(Hamilton) (offering a sinillar argument in favor of the presidential veto). 
76. Federalist 18 mostly deals with judicial review in enforcing the limitations on govern­
ment imposed by the Constitution, see THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 65, at 228-33 
(Hamilton), and it is in that discussion that the language quoted in the previous sentence of 
the text is found. See id. at 230. Hamilton's subsequent discussion of statutory interpretation 
is brief, see id. at 231-32, before he concludes generally, see id. at 232-33. 
77. Id. at 233. 
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impartial administration of the laws";78 and by the institutional 
weakness of the judiciary, whose judgments can be overridden by 
the two more powerful branches.79 Hamilton's criteria for con­
straining judges are more pragmatic criteria than the plain meaning 
criterion of the new textualism. 
Even if one accepts Scalia's premise that courts are supposed to 
play a neutral, nondiscretionary, and perhaps even mechanical, role 
in statutory policy implementation - a premise at some odds with 
the framers' expectations - it is not clear that his new textualism 
advances that goal. To begin with, it is mildly counterintuitive that 
an approach asking a court to consider materials generated by the 
legislative process, in addition to statutory text (also generated by 
the legislative process), canons of construction (generated by the 
judicial process), and statutory precedents (also generated by the 
judicial process), leaves the court with more discretion than an ap­
proach that considers just the latter three sources. Scalia responds 
to this intuition: Because "legislative history is extensive" for most 
statutes, "there is something for everybody," and that allows the 
willful judge additional cherry-picking options to justify her pre­
ordained position (p. 36). Scalia is in a better position to evaluate 
judicial behavior than I am, but Scalia's position is surely both too 
cynical and not cynical enough. It is too cynical to believe most 
judges are that result-oriented. Generally speaking, the average 
judge does not consider legislative history as authoritative and 
looks at history to answer questions posed by the text, as applied to 
the facts. The history informs her about the statute's terminology, 
goals, and structure.so Conversely, any judge who is determined to 
be willful is unaffected by methodology. If she cannot shop the leg­
islative history for friendly cites, she will shop dictionaries, canons 
of statutory construction, or statutory precedents. Keep this point 
in mind as we explore the next set of problems that the new textual­
ism needs to consider. 
* * * 
The first two dilemmas for the new textualism arise out of its 
proudly formalist presentation: a theory insisting that law is the ap­
plication of formal authority ought to have a coherent presentation 
for its own formal authorization. This is surprisingly difficult for the 
new textualism to accomplish, 'not only because the Blackstonian, 
common law approach to statutory interpretation the framers 
would have considered instinct in Article Ill's "judicial Power" is a 
chief object of attack in the Tanner Lectures, but also because this 
78. Id. at 227. 
79. See id. 
80. See Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A 
Neo·Realist View of Statutory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1993). 
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and other characteristically formalist inquiries are necessarily re­
gressive. That is, a formalist must demonstrate a formal authoriza­
tion, presumably in the Constitution, for the rules that must be 
applied in statutory cases, but in making such a demonstration the 
formalist is relying on rules of constitutional interpretation, which 
ought themselves to be formally demonstrated, and so on. My ini­
tial set of challenges (Parts I and II) press this dilemma. The next 
set of challenges (Parts III and IV) are regressive in a different way. 
A formalist not only has to defend rules that must be followed, but 
because rules do not apply themselves, the formalist also has to de­
fend rules about rules. This is a separate dilemma for any formalist 
theory, and Scalia's new textualism never adequately confronts it 
either. 
One consequence of this dilemma is that any formalist theory is 
ultimately conventional. Scalia's approach, understood this way, 
simply posits a different set of conventions than the Court's eclectic 
approach - for example, excluding legislative history and most 
purposive and justice-based arguments that the Court typically con­
siders and sometimes finds dispositive. Indeed, Holy Trinity 
Church stands for the proposition that plain text can be trumped by 
contrary legislative history, statutory purpose, and public values; for 
that reason the case is the natural target for Scalia in the Tanner 
Lectures. The next two problems I pose for the new textualism re­
lat� to the conventions Scalia insists upon. Do they better constrain 
willful judges, assure greater determinacy, and save transaction 
costs, as Scalia claims? Or are Scalia's conventions no more con­
straining, determinate, or cheap than those he attacks? 
III. THE PROBLEM OF CONTEXT 
It is a truism that interpreting a text requires context. Scalia 
seeks to turn this truth to his advantage. A new textualist considers 
plenty of context for figuring out the plain meaning of a statutory 
provision: the whole statute in which the provision is situated, dic­
tionaries and grammar books, at least some canons of statutory 
construction, and the common sense that God gave us. The new 
textualist, however, will almost never consider legislative history 
and usually not general statutory purpose and moral argumenta­
tion. Not only is the latter context illegitimate (Scalia's formalist 
argument), but it expands judicial discretion (Scalia's institutional 
argument, introduced in the previous Part) and is tremendously 
wasteful (Scalia's economic argument). As to the last, "fj]udges, 
lawyers, and clients will be saved an enormous amount of time and 
expense" because they will not have to research compendious legis­
lative histories, which even under the current system rarely have 
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payoffs.81 The formalist argument does not work. Do the institu­
tional and economic arguments make out a better case for the new 
textualism? 
Returning to Holy Trinity Church, consider the full panoply of 
new textualist arguments relating to the statutory prohibition 
against contracting with an "alien" to pay his transportation to the 
United States "to perform labor or service of any kind."82 Diction­
ary definitions of "labor or service," noted above, do not clearly 
resolve the issue.83 On the one hand, labor and service ordinarily 
meant physical and helper work to American judges, and presuma­
bly legislators, in 1885. On the other hand, the term labor could 
also mean brain work, although courts in the Chinese exclusion 
cases refused to read the term that broadly. And service could also 
mean any work for an employer, although work by professionals 
was usually deemed services rendered. "Labor or service of any 
kind" might be read more broadly than simple "labor or service," 
however. But the title of the statute was narrower: "An act to pro­
hibit the importation and migration of foreigners and aliens under 
contract or agreement to perform labor in the United States etc."84 
Other provisions of the statute also cut in different directions. 
The prohibition found in section 1 is enforced by provisions voiding 
such contracts (section 2) and fining the contractor (section 3). Sec­
tion 4 enforces the policy of section 1 by holding criminally ac­
countable the master of a ship "who shall knowingly bring within 
the United States . . .  any alien laborer, mechanic or artisan" who 
had contracted to perform "labor or service in the United States."85 
Section 4 is in pari materia with section 1, as they both regulate the 
importation of aliens coming to America under contract "to per­
form labor or service in the United States." Section 4's terminology 
is instructive as to the precise kinds of aliens excluded - laborers, 
mechanics, and artisans (all manual workers according to contem­
poraries).86 Section 4 regulates just manual workers imported for 
labor or service. Is there any reason, on the face of the statute, to 
separate its coverage from that of section 1? If not, section 4's rela­
tively unambiguous ambit ought to inform the more ambiguous am­
bit of section 1. On the other hand, section 5 specifically exempts 
from the ambit of sections 1 and 4 actors, artists, lecturers, singers, 
81. P. 36. I was the first, in print, to make the economic argument for tlie new textualism. 
See Eskridge, supra note *, at 669, 684-85 (drawing the general efficiency point from REED 
DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 150-51 (1975)). 
82. Act of Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, § 1, 23 Stat. 332, 332. 
83. See supra notes 24-25, 27, and accompanying text. 
84. 23 Stat. at 332. 
85. § 4, 23 Stat. at 333. 
86. See WEBSTER, supra note 24, at 79 (artisan); id. at 745 (laborer); id. at 823 (mechanic). 
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and domestic servants.87 By specifically listing those exempted, the 
statute can be read as signifying that all other occupations are in­
cluded in sections 1-4. Note how such a reading of Section 5 im­
poses a broad reading on section 4 that its words do not readily 
bear. 
The traditional canons of statutory construction also cut in dif­
ferent directions. 88 The rule of noscitur a sociis (a thing shall be 
known by its associates) suggests that section 4 is applicable only to 
manual workers - laborers, mechanics, artisans. The whole Act 
suggests that the prohibitions in sections 1 and 4 be read to the 
same effect, as two ways of addressing the general problem of aliens 
imported "to perform labor or service" in the United States. The 
rule of lenity requires that any ambiguities in this criminal statute 
be read against the government and in favor of the church's reading 
of the law to allow ministers, at least, to be brought into the country 
by contract. Such an exemption was, in fact, voted by Congress in 
1891 when it amended section 5 of the 1885 statute to exempt "min­
isters of any religious denomination," as well as "persons belonging 
to any recognized profession. "89 
On the other hand, the 1891 amendment provided that its rule 
should not apply to pending prosecutions9° and, hence, would not 
have applied retroactively to the 1887 prosecution of the church for 
importing the pastor. Indeed, the amendment underscores the ap­
plication of the canon inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (inclusion 
of one thing implies exclusion of all others) to section 5: because 
ministers were not included in the enumerated textual exemptions 
from the statute, ministers were excluded from the exemptions. 
The negative implication canon can also be used to argue that be­
cause Congress in section 4 specified the aliens imported as manual 
workers, its failure to use similar terminology in section 1 is signifi­
cant proof of a broader application.91 Commenting on the Tanner 
Lectures, Larry Tribe countered with the canon of avoiding consti­
tutional questions: construe the statute to avoid free exercise 
87. See § 5, 23 Stat. at 333. 
88. The Tanner Lectures accept some of the canons and criticize others, pp. 25-29, but 
Scalia himself relies heavily on substantive as well as linguistic canons in his capacity as a 
justice. See infra Part IV. 
89. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 5, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085. 
90. See § 12, 26 Stat. at 1086. 
91. On the other hand, section S's exemptions apply to section 4 just as much as to sec­
tion 1 - yet were completely unnecessary if section 4 applied just to manual workers. At 
least as to section 4, the inclusio unius canon cannot apply because the statute was not 
drafted coherently. Is there reason to believe that the interaction of sections 1 and 5 was any 
better considered? 
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problems, which would allow the minister in as a "lecturer," one of 
section S's exempted classes.92 
Does a textualist methodology demonstrate, objectively and 
clearly, that the importation of the pastor was "within the statute: 
end of case" (p. 20)? Does it also therefore demonstrate that the 
Court in Holy Trinity Church got the result as well as the reasoning 
100% wrong? I don't see how. Nor do I see how this sort of meth­
odology narrows the options of Scalia's bete noire, the willful judge. 
If such a judge wanted to allow importation of the pastor, he could 
emphasize the primary dictionary meanings (in 188S) of section l's 
terms "labor" and "service," the title of the statute, the narrow ar­
ticulation of the statute's ambit in section 4, and the rule of lenity. 
If such a judge wanted to disallow the importation, he could empha­
size the broader secondary dictionary definitions (in 1885) of "la­
bor" and "service," section l's broad exclusion of labor or service 
"of any kind," section S's specific exemptions, and the inclusio 
unius canon. The willful judge can "look over the heads of the 
crowd and pick out his friends" (p. 36). Even "honest textualists" 
will disagree. I consider Scalia an honest textualist, and he thinks 
the text supported the prosecution; Scalia would probably return 
the favor and accept me as an equally honest textualist - I am not 
just trying to make trouble for him - yet I think the textual argu­
ments cut against the prosecution, on the whole. 
I have been less persuaded of the determinacy of the textualist 
methodology than Scalia has, and Holy Trinity Church is simply the 
most recent illustration of our disagreement on this score.93 I have 
argued that legislative history in some cases could usefully narrow 
or correct the judge's options: ambiguities in text can sometimes be 
resolved, and resolved correctly, by consulting the legislative his­
tory. Immediately after I made that argument, the British House of 
Lords changed its mind about the meaning of a tax statute after the 
taxpayer, in petitioning for rehearing, presented the Lordships with 
the legislative history of a provision the Lords thought had a plain 
meaning supportive of the government. In Pepper v. Hart,94 the 
92. Pp. 92-93. Tribe makes no analytical argument for the proposition that the term "lec­
turer" might have been thought, in 1885, to include ministers. That is not the first, or second, 
or third, meaning that leaps to mind even today. Moreover, in 1885 or 1892, there was no 
free exercise precedent suggesting that a general exclusionary rule incidentally affecting the 
free exercise with r�ligion had any constitutional problem. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145 (1878) (rejecting a similar free exercise claim by Mormons); see also Employment 
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
93. See Eskridge. supra note *, at 675-76; see also EsKRIDGE, supra note 17, chs. 1 & 7; 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term - Foreword: 
Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARv. L. REv. 26 (1994). 
94. 3 W.L.R. 1032 (H.L. 1992). For American examples, see, for example, INS v. Car­
doza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Midlantic Natl. Bank v. New Jersey Dept. of Envtl. Pro­
tection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986). 
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House of Lords not only found the legislative history dramatically 
persuasive, but in the same case announced that they were aban­
doning the long-held English equivalent of the new textualism, a 
rule excluding consideration of legislative debates from statutory 
interpretation by judges. Is Holy Trinity Church such a case where 
legislative history narrows options and contributes to the right 
answer? 
Brewer's opinion for the Court relied on the Senate committee 
report statement that it considered "labor or service" to include 
only "manual labor or service." The committee regretted that it 
had not included such terminology in the bill and could not offer a 
floor amendment to add the term "manual," but the Congress was 
ready to adjourn and time did not permit either redrafting or 
amendment.95 Brewer concluded from this evidence, and from 
more general statements in the House report and a lower court 
opinion to the same effect, that the statute was only aimed at 
preventing "cheap unskilled labor" from entering the country, not 
"brain toilers," and certainly not "Christian ministers."96 
This evidence would seem to resolve the textual ambiguities in 
the way I was already leaning, toward lenity: the statute does not 
clearly enough cover the pastor. My Georgetown colleague Adrian 
Vermeule, however, has done a thorough legislative archaeology of 
the 1885 statute that supersedes Brewer's superficial treatment.97 
As Vermeule points out, the alien contract labor bill was not en­
acted in 1884, as the Senate committee had hoped, and was brought 
up in the 1885 session of the 48th Congress, just before the Cleve­
land administration took office. A lengthy debate was had on the 
bill in Congress, especially in the Senate, and the bill was amended 
in various minor ways. Among the amendments were those ex­
panding the exempted classes, but no amendment was even pro­
posed to make clear that "labor" referred only to "manual labor." 
Indeed, when pressed by an opponent of the bill, who argued that 
section 5 discriminated against "other classes of professional men" 
by granting exemptions to singers and lecturers and actors, but not 
to others similarly useful for the public, Senator Blair, the floor 
manager, seemed to concede that section 1 applied to brain toilers 
as well as manual ones. 
Mr. MORGAN: . . . [I]f [the alien] happens to be a lawyer, an artist, a 
painter, an engraver, a sculptor, a great author, or what not, and he 
comes under employment to write for a newspaper, or to write books, 
95. See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 464-65 (1892) (quoting 
SENATE CoMM. ON EDUCATION, 48TH CoNG., lsT SESs., REPORT, reprinted in 15 CONG. REc. 
6059 (1884)). 
96. Holy Trinity, 143 U.S. at 464-65. 
97. See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The 
Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming 1998). 
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or to paint pictures . . .  he comes under the general provisions of the 
bill. 
Mr. BLAIR: The Senator will observe that it is only the importation 
of such people under contract to labor that is prohibited. 
Mr. MORGAN: . . . I understand. 
Mr. BLAIR: If that class of people are liable to become the subject­
matter of such importation, then the bill applies to them. Perhaps the 
bill ought to be fu.rther amended. 
MR. MORGAN: . . . I shall propose when we get to it to put an 
amendment in there. I want to associate with the lecturers and sing­
ers and actors, painters, sculptors [etc.], or any person having special 
skill in any business, art, trade or profession.98 
The House floor manager, Representative Hopkins, generally 
opined, in response to an inquiry about agricultural laborers, that 
the bill "prohibits the importation under contract of all classes with 
the exceptions named in the bill."99 Vermeule believes that these 
exchanges establish that the legislative deal was to apply the statute 
to brain as well as manual toilers. 
If that were so, Holy Trinity Church would be like Pepper v. 
Hart, another example of the hypothesis that legislative history will 
sometimes clearly and helpfully resolve textual ambiguity.100 But it 
is not so clear in Holy Trinity Church. Even if the justices had 
looked at the full panoply of legislative history usefully retrieved by 
Vermeule, I doubt that they would have accepted Vermeule's read­
ing in 1892. It is important, at the outset, to remember that legisla­
tive history can be useful for three different interpretive purposes: 
(1) specific intent of the legislature, which is most relevant to inten­
tionalist theories; (2) general intent or goals of the statute, relevant 
to legal process theories; and (3) meta-intent, or background under­
standings about language· and terminology (relevant to textualists) 
as well as values and norms (relevant to normativists). 
Start, as Vermeule does, with specific intent. The Morgan-Blair 
exchange is the closest statement on point, but it is not quite the 
smoking gun Vermeule makes it out to be. Morgan was baiting 
Blair, who was vague in his response. Blair's whine that maybe the 
bill should be amended to limit its ambit to manual toil was 
98. 16 CONG. REc. 1633 (1885) (exchange between Sens. Morgan and Blair) (emphasis 
added). 
99. 16 CONG. REc. 2032 (1885). 
100. Vermeule, supra note 97, suggests that Holy Trinity Church might be evidence that 
courts are not institutionally competent to handle legislative materials but properly concedes 
that his suggestion is undercut by the novelty of the Court's approach as of 1892. Because 
legislative history had never been so dispositive before 1892, see EsKRIDGE, supra note 17, at 
208-09, the parties briefed it most unhelpfully (the church giving a misleading fragment of the 
history, the government ignoring it altogether), and the Court was not inclined to do extra 
research. Perusal of the Court's deployment of legislative history in the last generation sug­
gests to me that judges are more thorough, sophisticated, and critical in their use of such 
materials than Brewer was. 
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matched by Morgan's counter-whine that he would offer an amend­
ment to include all other professionals. Neither senator offered 
such an amendment,101 and no one else in the lengthy Senate de­
bate mentioned the issue. More importantly, neither Morgan nor 
any prominent senator thought it conceivable that the bill would 
exclude ministers.102 At least one prominent supporter of the bill, 
Senator John Sherman, opined that section 1, as written, was aimed 
at "men who come here under special contracts, mostly in large 
numbers, to work at largely reduced pay for the benefit of corpora­
tions."103 It would appear reasonable to think that Sherman, a ma­
jor supporter of the bill, and not Morgan, the most garrulous 
opponent of the bill, accurately characterized the import of the 
bill's ambit. When the federal court in the Southern District of 
New York construed the act, Scalia-like, to apply to the Holy Trin­
ity Church, Congress immediately amended the law to exempt min­
isters and professionals generally. The legislative history of the 
1891 amendment establishes that it was specifically a response to 
the lower court opinion in Holy Trinity Church.104 Reversing the 
lower court in Holy Trinity Church, the Supreme Court did not 
mention the 1891 statute, which by its terms did not apply to "pend­
ing proceedings,"105 but the Court later opined that the 1891 
amendment was a clarification rather than a change.106 
The legislative history is also relevant in what it shows about the 
purpose of the statute, how the sections of the statute fit together, 
and how language was used by the senators. All the supporters of 
the bill who spoke during the floor debates saw its purpose to be 
101. Contrary to his attack on the bill, Morgan offered an amendment to add "artisans" 
- not professionals or writers - to the list of those exempted. The amendment was re· 
jected. See 16 CoNG. REc. 1837 (1885). 
102. Morgan specifically considered exempt those "[p ]eople who can instruct us in morals 
and religion and in every species of elevation by lectures." 16 CoNG. REc. 1633 (1885). That 
statement refers to section S's exemption of "lecturers," which does not necessarily cover all 
or any ministers. It is significant, however, that the troublemaking Morgan neglected to tor­
ture Blair on that point. Morgan's objection that some classes of artists were exempt, while 
others were not, could have been much strengthened by the further point that a religious 
"lecturer" was exempt from the prohibitions, but a minister was not. It seems possible that 
even Morgan was assuming that ministers were not covered. 
103. 16 CoNG. REc. 1635 (1885) (statement of Sen. Sherman). Another supporter felt 
the bill was too broadly drafted, but only because it might thwart foreign firms seeking to 
relocate in the United States and bring some "laborers" with them. 16 CoNG. REc. 1635 
(1885) (statement of Sen. McPherson). 
104. See 21 CoNG. REc. 9439 (1890) (statement of Rep. Buchanan) (specifically adverting 
to the lower court decision); 21 CoNG. REc. 10,466-67 (1890) (discussing the need to exempt 
ministers). 
105. See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 551, § 12, 26 Stat. 1084, 1086. 
106. See United States v. Laws, 163 U.S. 258, 265 (1896) (exempting a chemist from the 
unamended 1885 statute based on Holy Trinity Church but invoking the 1891 amendment as 
support); see also 16 CoNG. REc. 1635 (1885) (statement of Sen. Sherman) (arguing the bill 
may be badly drafted, like the Chinese exclusion statutes, which were clarified by subsequent 
amendments). 
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preventing the importation of "laborers" who would undermine the 
wage position of American wage earners,107 the precise purpose ar­
ticulated in the committee reports and in the Supreme Court opin­
ion. The supporters saw the bill as of the same kind as, and in part 
copied from, the Chinese exclusion statutes,108 which courts, as 
noted above, interpreted to exempt actors and the like (that case 
law probably inspired some of the exemptions listed in section 5). 
All the senators who spoke on the issue, particularly the sponsor, 
Senator Blair, saw sections 1 and 4 to be regulating precisely the 
same classes of immigrants;109 The sponsor and other senators used 
the term "labor" to refer only to manual work and "laborers" to 
refer only to manual workers, 110 consistent with the courts' analysis 
of the Chinese exclusion statutes and treaties. No one in the exten­
sive debates referred to "service" independently of "labor," sug­
gesting the focus was on the latter term. On the other hand, the 
sponsors also realized that "manual labor" would have been a bet­
ter term to assure the statute would have been limited to the evil it 
was designed to suppress.111 In this respect, it is significant that 
supporters and opponents alike complained that the bill was badly, 
indeed loosely, drafted and lamented that Congress did not have 
time to rewrite it completely.112 
107. See, e.g., 16 CONG. REc. 1781-82 (1885) (Sen. Platt); 16 CoNG. REc. 1780 (1885) 
(Sen. Vest); 16 CONG. REc. 1778 (1885) (Sen. Miller); 16 CoNG. REc. 1634 (1885) (Sen. Sher­
man); 16 CoNG. REc. 1626 (1885) (Sen. Blair). 
108. See 16 CONG. REc. 1630 (1885) (statement of Sen. Blair) (noting that section 4 of the 
bill was copied from a similar provision in the 1882 Chinese exclusion law); 16 CONG. REc. 
(1885) (statement of Sen. Blair) (noting that the goal of the bill was to "prevent substantially 
the cooly practices" to which both Europe and China contributed). Senator Morgan ob­
jected to the "cooly" parallel and explained the Chinese exclusion laws as seeking to protect 
against bringing "any more of the inferior Asiatic or African races into this land" and not just 
to protect American laborers. See 16 CoNG. REc. 1631 (1885). Senator Sherman responded 
to Morgan and supported the class basis, rather than the race basis, for the Chinese legisla­
tion. See 16 CoNG. REc. 1634 (1885); see also 16 CoNG. REc. 1780 (1885) (statement of Sen. 
Vest). 
109. Senator Blair, the floor manager, said that section 4: 
is aimed . . .  against the man who knowingly brings an immigrant from foreign shores to 
our own, who comes here under and by virtue of a contract such as is prohibited by the 
bill. It seems to me that if we are to legislate on the subject at all it is folly not to reach 
this man who is the chief agent in the actual perpetration of the crime. 
16 CoNG. REc. 1630 (1885); see also 16 CoNG. REc. 1785 (1885) (statement of Sen. Blair); 16 
CoNG. REc. 1779 (1885) (statement of Sen. Miller); 16 CoNG. REc. 1629 (1885) (statement of 
Sen. McPherson); 16 CoNG. REc. 1626 (1885) (statement of Sen. Blair). 
110. See 16 CoNG. REc. 1628 (1885) (statement of Sen. Blair) (explaining a proviso in 
section 5 that made an allowance for employers to import "skilled workmen in foreign coun­
tries to perform labor in the United States" for infant industries); see also 16 CONG. REc. 
1787 (1885) (statement of Sen. Harrison); 16 CONG. REc. 1785 (1885) (statement of Sen. 
Call); 16 CoNG. REc. 1784 (1885) (statement of Sen. Sherman); 16 CoNG. REc. 1783 (1885) 
(statement of Sen. Dawes); 16 CoNG. REc. 1781-82 (1885) (statement of Sen. Platt); 16 
CoNG. REc. 1779 (1885) (statement of Sen. Miller). 
111. 15 CoNG. REc. 6059 (1884) (Sen. Blair). 
112. See, e.g., 15 CoNG. REc. 5354 (1884) (Rep. Kelley); 16 CoNG. REc. 1622-23 (1885) 
(Sen. Hawley); 16 CoNG. REc. 1625 (1885) (Sen. Ingalls); 16 CONG. REc. 1635 (1885) (Sen. 
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On the whole, this latter evidence reinforces my impression that 
the plain meaning of the statute is ambiguous enough to trigger the 
rule of lenity in the Case of the Imported Pastor and, further, leaves 
me open to the possibility in future cases that the statute might be 
limited, in the way section 4 is limited, to laborers, artisans, and 
mechanics - manual workers. But I do not find the legislative his­
tory one-sided, for I am strongly impressed by the arguments sug­
gested by Vermeule: the Senate sponsor assured the Senate that 
section l's prohibition swept beyond the evil addressed by the bill, 
the sponsors never proposed an amendment that could have clearly 
narrowed the statute to "manual labor" and "manual service," and 
everyone considered section 5 to be the repository of exhaustively 
considered and debated exemptions (greatly strengthening the 
otherwise dubious inclusio unius argument against Brewer's result). 
Like the arguments from statutory text, the arguments from legisla­
tive history provide ammunition for both sides in Holy Trinity 
Church, although my own reading does not refute my impression 
that the statute is not clearly enough applicable to a minister to 
escape the rule of lenity. 
Holy Trinity Church, therefore, is a case where legislative his­
tory does little work, beyond buttressing already-formed impres­
sions. Neither Scalia nor I - nor Brewer nor Vermeule, by the way 
- would change our text-based votes after examining the legisla­
tive history. Although I think as a formal matter of textual con­
struction that Scalia gets it wrong in Holy Trinity Church, he would 
not get it right if I required him to read the legislative history -
and he could say the same about me. Thus, although the formalist 
and institutional arguments for excluding legislative history remain 
unproven or unfounded, the economic argument is not o.nly plausi­
ble, but receives some support from my analysis of Holy Trinity 
Church. Even with the aid of hours of legislative history reading 
which refutes much of Brewer's opinion in the case, I am left where 
I was before, as would be the large majority of other interpreters.113 
Sherman); 16 CONG. REc. 1780 (1885) (Sen. Vest). Senator Blair admitted that the bill was 
drafted outside Congress "by the men whose interests it undertakes to guard and conserve." 
16 CoNG. REc. 1622 (1885). Senator Platt co�plained that these drafters were insufficiently 
"familiar with legal phraseology" and therefore drafted a bill which was "crude" and "not 
properly drawn to effectuate the purposes of those who believe in the principle of the bill." 
16 CoNG. REc. 1781 (1885). Some supporters of the bill opined that any imperfections could 
be corrected by subsequent amendment. 16 CONG. REc. 1635 (1885) (Sen. Sherman). 
113. I offer this thought experiment from my 1997 fall term Legislation class at 
Georgetown. I asked all the students to bring with them to the Holy Trinity Church class a 
statement of their vote and reasons for it. 1\vo-thirds of those enrolled in the class complied 
(I made the mistake of not making the exercise compulsory); by a margin of 38 to 33 the 
students followed the statutory plain meaning and dissented from the Court's opinion. I 
divided the students into two groups and gave each group separate handouts detailing addi­
tional textual evidence (dictionary definitions and section 4) and legislative history 
(Vermeule's smoking guns, plus general statements of purpose and use of the term "labor"). 
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The only potential value - but a big one! - of a rule excluding 
resort to legislative history is that it might save a lot of wasted effort 
- expensive research and analysis that have no payoff. 
· 
Pause for a moment to review the cost-benefit calculus for 
Scalia's rule excluding legislative history. The benefits of an exclu­
sionary rule would be: 
1. the net savings in research costs by attorneys, law clerks, and 
others analyzing statutory issues;114 
2. the rule of law and democracy benefit, if excluding legislative his­
tory reduces judicial discretion or uncertainty in statutory cases; 
3. the rule of law and democracy benefit, if excluding legislative his­
tory encourages the legislative process to write statutes that more 
transparently reveal the deals and rules agreed upon. 
My judgment is that benefit (1) involves a very large number of 
dollars, while benefits (2) and (3) are virtually nil. 
Offset against the benefits of an exclusionary rule, of course, 
must be the costs of such a rule: 
1. if the exclusionary rule were applied to existing statutes,115 the rule 
of law, democracy, and reliance costs of negating deals made clear 
in the legislative history but not in the statutory text; 
2. new errors, if any, that would be introduced by excluding legisla­
tive history, including greater need for the legislative process to 
sacrifice parts of its limited agenda to monitor and respond to tex­
tualist decisions; 
3. increased willingness of judges to overrule agency interpretatiqns 
of statutes because the agency is influenced by legislative expecta­
tions that judges think contrary to statutory text.116 
The handouts were given in reverse order for the two groups - the legislative history one 
first for one group, the text one first for the other group - but the order of presentation, 
surprisingly, did not affect the results: 15 of the 38 students dissenting in Holy Trinity Church 
(40% of the dissenters) changed their votes after consulting the textual evidence. Four stu­
dents changed their votes after consulting the new legislative history evidence, but in cross­
cutting directions - two dissenters defected to the Brewer camp, and two of Brewer's disci­
ples defected to dissent. After reviewing all the evidence, the students voted 23 to 46 for the 
Brewer result, but with increased disdain for the sloppy process by which Brewer reached it. 
114. By net savings, I mean the following: the amount of time attorneys spend on legisla­
tive history research and argumentation that they would not spend under an exclusionary 
rule, less the additional time they would spend doil)g other kinds of statutory research, such 
as dictionary shopping and consulting professional linguists. 
115. I think retroactive application of an exclusionary rule in this way would be uncon­
scionable as a dirty bait and switch on poor Congress. Eskridge, New Textualism, supra note 
*. The new textualists and their academic allies all seem to support it, but I have never seen a 
good reason for their position. 
116. Merrill, supra note 14. See Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory 
Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better than 
Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1231 (1996); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme 
Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Adminis­
trative State, 95 CoLUM. L. RE.v. 749 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia's Democratic 
Formalism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 550-55 (1997) (reviewing ANroNIN SCALIA ET AL., A MATIER 
OF lNraRPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997)). 
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My judgment is that cost (1) is substantial, while costs (2) and (3) 
are possibly substantial but, for me, too speculative for even edu­
cated guesses. Overall, the cost-benefit calculus is indeterminate, 
which means that Scalia's approach requires further study. 
IV. THE PROBLEM OF LOOSE CANONS 
Important to my resolution of the Case of the Imported Pastor 
is the rule of lenity. Unlike Scalia, I find the text of the alien con­
tract labor law replete with ambiguities. The rule of lenity demands 
that penal statutes, such as this one (the Church was assessed a 
$1000 fine but was not imprisoned), be construed in favor of the 
accused when its application is ambiguous. The Tanner Lectures 
grudgingly accept the validity of the rule of lenity, but only by rea­
son of "sheer antiquity" (p. 29). As for the other canons of statu­
tory construction, Scalia offers himself as a skeptic. "To the honest 
textualist, all of these preferential rules and presumptions are a lot 
of trouble" and, indeed, "increase the unpredictability, if not arbi­
trariness of judicial decisions" (p. 28). 
Scalia's position reveals deep problems for his philosophy of in­
terpretation. First, as noted above, a formalist theory has got to 
have rules about rules. It is not enough to say, follow the ordinary 
meaning of plain texts, without providing secondary rules about 
how to determine such meaning.117 The canons are rules about 
rules. A textualist, therefore, is likely to follow and endorse 
textual-meaning canons, which Scalia surely does. His criticism 
must be limited to the substantive canons such as the rule of lenity, 
which he nonetheless accepts for "antiquity" reasons. This conces­
sion is potentially expansive, because the "dice-loading rules" (p. 
28) Scalia criticizes are for the most part entrenched in judicial 
practice and precedent - even more so than the hated use of legis­
lative history. Not only would it be hard for a new textualist to 
dislodge these rules from their "canonical" place in American law, 
but the textualist who refuses to consider legislative history will be 
sorely tempted to rely on those rules to provide necessary context 
and analysis for deciding issues of interpretation. This latter idea is 
suggested by the pre-Pepper v. Hart practice in the United King­
dom and by the practice in states not having much usable legislative 
history. But the problem is that the substantive, dice-loading ca­
nons risk the normative appeal of the new textualism: they are, as 
Scalia says, potentially undemocratic because they are judge-made 
presumptions and rules that Congress has a hard time trumping; 
potentially lawless because they afford the willful judge a variety of 
117. That is, unless one simply retreats to an intuitionist "I know it when I see it" ap· 
proach to plain meaning. That is a possible stance, but I would think not appealing to a 
formalist who relies on objectivity and neutrality. 
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sources for massaging different meanings out of the same text; and 
potentially destabilizing if judges succumb to the temptation of cre­
ating new canons or adjusting old ones to their changing tastes.118 
Scalia's Tanner Lectures ask: "Can we really just decree that we 
will interpret the laws that Congress passes to mean less or more 
than what they fairly say?" His answer: "I doubt it" (p. 29). "What 
they fairly say" is loaded with convention. Indeed, the most pro­
ductive use of legislative history is to help judges figure out what 
conventions Congress was assuming or invoking (see my discussion 
of the history in Holy Trinity Church). The longstanding substan­
tive canons can be viewed as conventions underlying congressional 
deliberations. Indeed, between 1987 and 1994, the Rehnquist Court 
had reason to apply no fewer than seventy-nine different substan­
tive presumptions, clear statement rules, and super-strong clear 
statement rules in literally hundreds of statutory cases.119 This 
would seem defensible, except that in many of the cases the Court 
was subtly playing with or altering the conventions - creating new 
presumptions, elevating old presumptions to the status of clear 
statement rules, and reconfiguring old clear statement rules as 
super-strong clear statement rules, requiring manifest clarity from 
Congress.12° Scalia joined or wrote the Court's opinion in almost 
all of the cases where the Court invoked or revised these substan­
tive canons. Most surprising is that he wrote the opinion for the 
Court in one of the most aggressive and dynamic deployments of a 
substantive canon in recent memory. 
The issue in BFP v. Resolution Trust Corporation121 was under 
what circumstances the proceeds of a foreclosure sale of mortgaged 
real estate satisfy the Bankruptcy Code's rule nullifying property 
transfers by insolvent debtors within a year of bankruptcy, unless 
they are in exchange for "a reasonably equivalent value."122 Based 
on the statutory requirement of reasonably equivalent value, federal 
appeals courts refused to credit foreclosure transfers without a 
showing of at least rough market equivalence; disagreeing with its 
sibling circuits, the Ninth Circuit agreed that such was the plain 
meaning of the statute but invoked policy reasons to hold the rea­
sonably equivalent value requirement satisfied by whatever price 
118. See Eskridge, supra note *, at 683-84. 
119. The cases are collected in Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 93, at 101-08. 
120. For examples of reconfigured substantive canons, see, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. 
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 {1991); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 {1991); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 
501 U.S. 452 (1991); see also EsKRIDGE, supra note 17, at 275-97; William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Law­
making, 45 V AND. L. RE.v. 593 {1992). 
121. 511 U.S. 531 {1994). 
122. 11 U.S.C. § 548{a){2) {1988). 
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the property fetched in a foreclosure sale.123 A closely divided 
Supreme Court, in a majority opinion by Justice Scalia, affirmed the 
nontextualist Ninth Circuit and rejected the various equivalence 
rules created by the textualist circuits. The Court held that, so long 
as the relevant state procedures were followed, whatever price the 
sale generated - even $1 - satisfied the Bankruptcy Code. BFP is 
a surprising decision for a textualist, as Justice Souter's dissenting 
opinion charged.124 Scalia stoicly asserted that "reasonable 
equivalent value" is ambiguous language.125 It is ambiguous in 
some respects, but it unambiguously forecloses a "whatever you 
got" approach, as the Ninth Circuit opinion cheerfully conceded. 
For the lower court, the plain meaning needed to be compromised, 
because it would inject substantial uncertainty into the foreclosure 
sale bidding process and would undermine the smooth functioning 
of local real estate markets. The lower court also invoked the spirit 
of federalism, respecting state power in areas of traditional alloca­
tive regulation.126 Holy Trinity Church, Batman! 
Although affirming, Scalia did not defend his choice as an open 
policy decision, as the Ninth Circuit did. Rather, he read the text in 
light of the super-strong rule against interpreting federal statutes to 
invade state governmental decisionmaking that the Court had just 
created in Gregory v. Ashcroft.127 Scalia's opinion reasoned that 
123. See In re BFP, 974 F.2d 1144, 1148 {9th Cir. 1992). The lower court decisions to the 
contrary are listed in BFP, 511 U.S. at 536. 
124. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 552-57 (Souter, J., dissenting). Compare PUD No. 1 of Jeffer­
son County v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 724 {1994) {Thomas, J., joined by 
Scalia, J., dissenting) (apparent plain meaning of statute trumped by "larger statutory frame­
work" and statute's balance of federal-state interests) with 511 U.S. at 723 {Stevens, J., con­
curring) (asserting that the plain meaning of the statute makes this an easy case and that 
there is no textualist basis for dissenting, as Scalia does). 
125. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 546-47. 
126. See BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148-49. I have endorsed this and other values as sound bases 
for a constitutional policy of federalism. See Jenna Bednar & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Stead­
ying the Court's "Unsteady Path": A Theory of Judicial Enforcement of Federalism, 68 S. 
CAL. L. REv. 1447 {1995). 
127. 501 U.S. 452 {1991). The majority opinion in Gregory, joined by Justice Scalia, cre­
ated a new super-strong clear statement rule to interpret the age discrimination law to ex­
empt state appointed judges. The concurring opinion by Justice White showed that the same 
result flowed from ordinary textualist precepts. The Tanner Lectures are overall more con­
sistent with the White approach. 
In the Tanner Lectures, Scalia adds an odd caveat for congressional elimination of state 
sovereign immunity, and by analogy, for congressional regulation of the states qua states: 
because such legislation is "an extraordinary act, one would normally expect it to be explic­
itly decreed rather than offhandedly implied - so something like a 'clear statement' rule is 
merely normal interpretation." P. 29. Aside from the fact that such legislation is no longer 
extraordinary - see the many labor, civil rights, and Indian tribe statutes - an unusual act 
does not require a clearer statement than a usual act, unless there is also a normative reason 
to require a more focused, specific statement. For example, it is highly unusual for Congress 
to enact legislation that helps gay people. Should that be sufficient reason to require a super­
clear statement before a statute can be interpreted for the benefit of gay people? See also 
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 406 (1991) {Scalia, J., dissenting) {sharply criticizing statu-
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the statute is not sufficiently "clear and manifest" in order to "dis­
place traditional State regulation" of foreclosure sales.128 But the 
whole point of a federal bankruptcy law is to replace normal rules 
of state contract and property law with the fresh-start and fairness 
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.129 The fresh-start provisions 
supplant state law by nullifying outstanding debts and liens. The 
fairness provisions supplant state law by nullifying transactions 
taken by the debtor to cheat some creditors out of their fair share. 
Congress . has authority to pass such legislation pursuant to the 
bankruptcy power of Article I, Section 8, Clause 4, and the 
Supremacy Clause of Article VI requires the states to enforce such 
statutes in place of their own. Not only was it clear that Congress 
intended to displace state law, but Gregory was not even formally , 
applicable. · Scalia was relying on an expanded version of the prior 
case: Gregory involved federal regulation of state governments 
themselves; Scalia expanded it to create, for the one case, a rule 
requiring a super-strong clear statement before the Court would 
construe the Bankruptcy Code to preempt state property law.13o 
The result in BFP came as a surprise to most: all the appellate 
courts except the Ninth Circuit thought it precluded by the statu­
tory text, Congress had specifically considered and rejected the re­
sult, and most of the bankruptcy bar felt a contrary result mandated 
by the rule of law, even if not by good policy. Scalia's canonical 
reasoning in BFP came as a surprise to everybody: neither the 
Ninth Circuit (the court being affirmed) nor the respondent (the 
winning party) had even cited Gregory. 
BFP is a dramatic illustration of Scalia's warning that, "[t]o the 
honest textualist, all of these preferential rules and presumptions 
are a lot of trouble" (p. 28). But it also illustrates how a textualism 
refusing to consider the legislative context of statutes is going to be 
tempted not only to rely on substantive canons, but also to develop 
them, common law style. If that happens, as new canons are cre­
ated or strengthened and old ones narrowed as Supreme Court 
tory interpretation inference from Congress's failure to signal departure from longstanding 
policy). But Scalia refuses to present normative dimensions to his rules or his practice. Part 
VI of this review argues that Scalia does not escape normativity, and this canon and the 
dozens like it that Scalia endorses and vigorously applies are normative presumptions that 
are not neutral. 
128. See BFP, 511 U.S. at 544, 544-45 n.8 (quoting English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 
72, 79 (1990) and discussing Gregory). 
129. BFP, 511 U.S. at 565-69 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
130. Scalia had rejected such an aggressive canon for determining statutory preemption 
in a case involving federal regulation of smoking. See Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 
U.S. 504, 544-48 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing against 
a narrow construction of express federal statutory provisions preempting state police power 
regulations). Cippollone, by the way, recognizes a presumption against federal preemption 
of state law, but a presumption that can be more easily rebutted than the super-strong clear 
statement rule of Gregory. 
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composition changes, the honest textualist becomes just as unpre­
dictable as, and may even come to resemble, her doppelganger the 
willful judge. 
The phenomenon of shopping the canons - picking out the 
friendly ones and ignoring or explaining away the rest - afflicts not 
only BFP and other deployments of the substantive canons, but 
also deployment of text-based canons as well. Consider the debate 
in MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T.131 Section 203(a) of 
the Communications Act of 1934132 requires communications com­
mon carriers to file schedules of charges and conditions of service 
with the FCC; section 203(b )(2) permits the FCC to "modify any 
requirement made by or under the authority of this section."133 Re­
sponding to the perceived need for more competition in the long 
distance telephone market, the FCC between 1980 and 1992 issued 
a series of orders which ultimately allowed nondominant - that is, 
not-AT&T - companies to avoid the expensive process of filing 
and amending tariff schedules. The Supreme Court, in an opinion 
by Justice Scalia, held that the FCC's policy violates the plain mean­
ing of section 203(b )(2). The FCC argued that its authority to mod­
ify any requirement of section 203 allows it in appropriate 
circumstances to exempt companies from the filing requirements. 
Scalia's opinion held that the authority to modify means only "to 
change moderately or in minor fashion," a standard dictionary defi­
µition of "modify."134 Because the FCC's orders worked a "funda­
mental" rather than "minor" change in section 203's requirements, 
it was not a permissible modification. This would seem like a pre­
dictable, lawful, objective interpretation - until you read Justice 
Stevens's dissenting opinion, which invoked the same linguistic can­
ons to show that "modify" can have a broader meaning. 
As Scalia conceded, Webster's Third, the most frequently cited 
dictionary by the Court, defines "modify" as including "to make a 
basic or important change in." That would seem to support the 
agency's view, which is supposed to prevail when a regulatory stat­
ute is susceptible of two plausible readings, but Scalia dismissed 
that use as colloquial and idiosyncratic to that dictionary.135 Scalia 
131. 512 U.S. 218 (1994). 
132. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (1988). 
133. 47 u.s.c. § 203(b)(2) (1988). 
134. MCI, 512 U.S. at 225. 
135. See MCI, 512 U.S. at 225-26, 226 n.2, 228 n.3 (explaining the Court's rejection of the 
definition in WEBSTER'S TmRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY and related Webster's 
products). Justice Scalia belittled Webster's Third for its colloquial usages, but the Court 
itself relies on that dictionary more than any other, see Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 
U.S. 246, 255 (1994) (handed down three days after MCI); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries 
and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1437, 1439 n.12 (1994) [hereinafter Note, 
Looking It Up], including decisions written by Justice Scalia, see Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 
U.S. 170, 177, 179 (1993); Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. Wrigley, 507 U.S. 214, 223, 226 
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was wrong, though. Other dictionaries, including the distinguished 
Oxford English Dictionary, define "modify" in a way that allows 
exemption of whole categories from a regulatory regime.136 Most 
on point, the 1933 edition of Black's Law Dictionary, published the 
year before the Communications Act was passed, defined the term 
as "an alteration which introduces new elements into the details, or 
cancels some of them, but leaves the general purpose and effect of 
the subject-matter intact."137 As Stevens argued, if section 203 is 
viewed "as part of a statute whose aim is to constrain monopoly 
power, the Commission's decision to exempt nondominant carriers 
is a rational and 'measured' adjustment to novel circumstances."138 
It is hard to explain MCI as simply an exercise in predictable 
text application. Instead, it exemplifies the Court's increasing dic­
tionary shopping and suggests the hypothesis that the linguistic or 
text-based canons are just as manipulable as the substantive c<;m­
ons.139 Like legislative history, the canons and the dictionaries are 
a "broad playing field," and "there is something for everybody. As 
Judge Harold Leventhal used to say, the trick is to look over the 
heads of the crowd and pick out your friends" (p. 36). 
* * * 
Problems 1 and 2 pose logical dilemmas for Scalia's particular 
brand of textualism. Problems 3 and 4 question whether Scalia's 
methodology can deliver the greater objectivity, predictability, and 
determinacy he promises in the Tanner Lectures. A final set of 
problems relate to the role and capacity of judges. The Tanner Lec­
tures are critical of the common law judge as an anachronism in the 
modem administrative state. This is a striking and important cri­
tique. From Roscoe Pound to Learned Hand to Henry Hart and 
Albert Sacks to Antonin Scalia, scholars and judges of this century 
have been asking this question. Now that legislation has displaced 
(1992); California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991). Moreover, the Court traditionally has 
followed a word's "ordinary" meaning rather than its "technical" meaning. See Liteky v. 
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 552 (1994) (Scalia, J.) (insisting upon colloquial meaning of "bias 
or prejudice," thereby importing an unstated "invidiousness" requirement into the statute at 
issue). 
136. See 9 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 952 (2d ed. 1989) (providing this illustration 
from 1610: "For so Mariana modefies his Doctrine, that the Prince should not execute any 
Clergy man, though hee deser[v]e it."). 
137. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1198 (3d ed. 1933). The Court has been hopelessly in­
consistent in its usage of particular dictionaries and has not paid attention to whether the 
dates of the enactment of the statute and of the publication of the dictionary it uses to con­
strue the statute correspond. See Note, Looking It Up, supra note 135, at 1447-48 (suggesting 
that the Court has engaged in dictionary shopping - that is, finding dictionaries to support 
results being driven by other factors). 
138. MCI, 512 U.S. at 241 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
139. See Lawrence Solan, When Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 AM. SPEECH 50 (1993); 
Note, Looking It Up, supra note 135 (providing an excellent critique of the Court's increasing 
reliance on dictionaries). 
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the common law as our main source of authority, is the common 
law method of incremental case-by-case judgment, working by anal­
ogy from authorities and precedents to unanticipated facts - is that 
method obsolete? Scalia thinks that it is and that the new textual­
ism embodies a better institutional role for the Court. I am more 
dubious on both scores, for reasons explored in the following 
problems. 
V. THE PROBLEM OF THE JU DICIARY'S INSTITUTIONAL ROLE IN 
A DEMOCRACY 
One criticism of Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation in 
BFP, as well as in Holy Trinity Church, is that it disrupts congres­
sionally approved practice. Congress considered the federalism 
concerns articulated by Scalia and the Ninth Circuit when it 
amended the Bankruptcy Code in 1984, but was unmoved by the 
federalism arguments that moved the Court: Congress rejected an 
amendment which would have guaranteed the integrity of state 
foreclosure sales.140 In contrast, the Court in Holy Trinity Church 
interpreted the immigration law precisely as Congress rewrote it in 
1891. Because the 1891 amendment was not retroactive,141 Scalia 
would have considered it irrelevant, but his result would have cre­
ated an incoherent treatment of imported ministers, with no sup­
port from Congress or the political process. 
I have criticized Scalia's application of plain meaning above, but 
assume that he is right about plain meaning in both BFP and Holy 
Trinity Church but that I am right about the political equilibrium in 
both cases. In that event, the new textualism opens up a tension 
between the rule of law and democracy that softer versions of textu­
alism - follow the text but check it against the legislative history -
avoid. Majority-based choices in that event would more often be 
trumped by dictionary-toting,142 grammar-minded judges holding 
Congress to the letter of what it writes. If so, the new textualist is 
less responsive to democratic desires than the faithful agent, the 
statutory interpreter who tries to figure out what the principal 
would have her do under the circumstances.143 The faithful agent is 
140. See BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 550 n.1, 554 n.6, 555-56, 567-70 
{1994) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
141. The amendment was by its terms not retroactive. Note, however, that Scalia re­
quires a super-strong clear statement of retroactivity, another example of the substantive 
canons which he insists on making more rather than less aggressive. See Landgraf v. USI 
Fiim Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 {1994) {Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
142. But tote not Webster's Third! See MCI, 512 U.S. 218. 
143. The faithful agent is developed in William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative 
Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 319, 322-30 {1989). See also RICHARD A. PosNER, THE PROBLEMS 
OF JURISPRUDENCE 269-73 {1990); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative 
Supremacy, 78 GEO. LJ. 281 {1989); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEXAS L. 
REv. 1165 {1993). 
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a more cooperative partner in the enterprise of statutory interpreta­
tion and better reflects the Court's role as a partner with Congress 
in the process of statutory law elaboration. . 
Consider this homely example: Scalia, a hotel manager, tells 
me, his employee, to "gather all the ashtrays in the public areas of 
the hotel and put them in my office by 2:00 p.m. today," while he is 
dining. I diligently collect the ashtrays until I come to an elevator 
bank, where a metal ashtray is bolted onto the wall. Should I rip it 
off? A pragmatic agent would leave it on the wall, construing "all 
ashtrays" to exclude those whose removal would be unduly costly, a 
judgment call. It is not clear what the new textualist would do. 
When I have posed this hypothetical in Legislation classes, some 
Scalians rip the ashtrays off the wall, and others do not because 
they consider the textual command "absurd" in those circum­
stances. The former are honest textualists, but crummy agents. I 
don't know how Scalia would answer the ashtrays example; but up­
holding the prosecution in Holy Trinity Church in 1892 approaches 
that level of unreasonableness, assuming the accuracy of Brewer's 
description of Congress' values, goals, and beliefs. Why shouldn't 
interpreters be willing to accommodate plain meaning to fit the pur­
pose of the enterprise, other goals pursued by the principal, and 
common values? Scalia makes three different kinds of arguments 
against such an approach. 
First, Scalia argues that pragmatic approaches are too open­
ended, providing increased opportunities for the· judge to read her 
own preferences into directives and undermining the predictability 
and determinacy of law. The "discretion of judges" argument is a 
red herring. All interpretive methodologies, including textual ones, 
present the willful judge with discretionary choices, as discussed 
above. More importantly, it is less productive to focus on the will­
ful judge and more productive to focus on the cooperative judge, as 
the prototype: not only are most judges cooperative rather than 
willful, but the assumption of cooperativeness is more consistent 
with the philosophy underlying Article III and may itself contribute 
to a judicial culture where willfulness is stigmatized. Most impor­
tantly, judges like other state officials are concretely constrained by 
practice - the feedback they get from Congress, lower courts, 
agencies, and the citizenry. 
Second, Scalia maintains that a strict textual approach is ulti­
mately democracy-enhancing. "What is of paramount importance 
is that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear 
interpretive rules, so that it may know the effect of language it 
adopts."144 Thus, even when the Court interprets a statute contrary 
to congressional expectations in a particular case, this may not be 
144. Fmley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556' (1989). 
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countermajoritarian in the longer run if Congress learns a valuable 
rule which can guide its future statutory drafting efforts. Ulti­
mately, the new textualism might be not only democratic, but also 
might induce Congress to change its way of writing statutes so that 
the democratic process actually works better. Specifically, by dis­
couraging lawmaking through plants in the legislative history, Scalia 
might encourage the legislative process to be more transparent 
about what deals are struck and what trade-offs are made to obtain 
statutory enactments.145 
Would the new textualism, if adopted, be the sort of tough love 
that would impel Congress to write clearer statutes and make more 
transparent policy choices?146 It is too early to tell whether the 
Supreme Court's increasingly, but still far from wholly, textualist 
methodology has affected or will affect Congress's approach to stat­
ute writing. One would expect that Congress would move more 
material from committee reports to the statute itself. Apart from 
whatever Article I, Section 7 satisfaction might be derived from 
that, would it be a beneficial change? What would be the costs? 
The main cost would be the Court's imposition on Congress's 
limited agenda.147 Textualist decisions are less likely to reflect orig­
inal congressional preferences and much less likely to reflect ongo­
ing congressional preferences (BFP and Holy Trinity Church), and 
so deals and compromises would be harder to reach because of less 
certainty of enforcement and practical elaboration on the part of a 
textualist Court.148 Congress has a severely limited agenda and, 
even with large staffs, does not have the political energy to adopt 
more than a fraction of the measures deserving attention. The new 
textualism would theoretically require more political and technical 
attention to each bill than do traditional practices, and that phe­
nomenon would diminish Congress's ability to pass statutes. To be 
sure, this diminished capacity would not be a cost if one viewed 
congressional statute creation cynically, as Scalia does in the Tanner 
Lectures (pp. 32-34) and even more explicitly in some judicial deci-
145. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Politics, Interpretation, and the Rule of 
Law, in THE RuLE OF LAw: NoMos XXXVI 265 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994). 
146. If these are the goals, why not enforce the nondelegation doctrine? While Scalia 
eschews this approach because there are no judicially administrable standards for the doc· 
trine, MCI can best be read as a nondelegation case: the term modify is susceptible of differ­
ent meanings; the Court chose the narrower meaning, for the broader one would have 
effected a questionable delegation of undirected lawmaking power to the agency, in contra· 
vention of Article l's command that all statutory lawmaking be directed by Congress or by 
intelligible standards Congress sets. 
147. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Stat· 
utes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1994); Muriel Morisey Spence, 
The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 585 (1994). 
148. Textualist decisions are the ones most frequently overridden by Congress in recent 
years. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Deci· 
sions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 347-48 (1991). 
May 1998] Textualism 1551 
sions.149 Such a view is not fair to Congress, however, and is at 
odds with the respect that the Constitution insists be afforded to 
Congress as a formal matter.150 
Nor is it clear that Congress is institutionally capable of re­
sponding to the new textualism by anticipating more issues and 
resolving them more clearly in statutes. Tue lawmaking process is 
an extended and frequently chaotic one, involving hundreds of leg­
islators, staff members, executive branch officials, and lobbyists for 
important proposals. In reaching compromises and holding to­
gether fragile coalitions, many issues are not thoroughly considered, 
and many others are not going to be anticipated even with further 
deliberation. Even when issues are anticipated and considered, 
they may not be easy to incorporate clearly into statutory text, for 
reasons of politics, time, and drafting skill. If this is the case, as it 
seems to be for at least some major legislation, the new textualism 
unfairly saddles Congress with obligations it cannot always fulfill. 
Perhaps the most important question is what effects diminished 
congressional lawmaking and enhanced judicial disruption would 
have on statutory schemes. A literature on the effect of the new 
textualism on substantive areas of law, especially tax, bankruptcy, 
and civil rights law is now developing. Because this literature and 
the new textualism are both in their infancy, firm conclusions can­
not yet be drawn. But it is significant that respected scholars in 
different substantive areas have cautioned that rigidly text-based 
approaches neglecting practical, political, and purposive features of 
the enterprise have left lawyers and citizens confused about what is 
required of them, have destabilized longstanding statutory policies, 
and have produced wasteful litigation.151 Thus far, scholars have 
149. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment). But see Brudney, supra note 147 (vividly disputing Scalia's account of the 
legislative process generally); Michael Livingston, Congress, the Courts, and the Code: Legis­
lative History and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEXAS L. REv. 819 (1991). 
150. If Congress is supreme in the statutory arena, as the Constitution suggests, why 
shouldn't it, rather than the Court, call the shots? Congress does not want agents who do 
nothing but apply plain meanings. It wants agents who make the statutory scheme work over 
time or who adjust the statutory scheme to reflect new political equilibria. Recall the ashtray 
hypothetical. . 
151. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Theodore M. Shaw, The Costs of Incoherence: A 
Comment on Plain Meaning, West Vrrginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, and Due Pro­
cess of Statutory Interpretation, 45 VAND. L. REv. 687 (1992) (civil rights law); William D. 
Araiza, Text, Purpose and Facts: The Relationship Between CERCLA Sections 107 and 113, 
72 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 193 (1996) (environmental law); Jack M. Beermann, The Supreme 
Court's Narrow View on Civil Rights, 1993 SUP. Cr. REv. 199 (civil rights law); Douglas M. 
Branson & Karl Shumpei Okamoto, The Supreme Court's Literalism and the Definition of 
"Security" in the State Courts, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1043 (1993) (securities law); Brud­
ney, supra note 147 (labor law); Wtlliam N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? The Court/ 
Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REv. 613 (1991) (civil rights law); Cathe­
rine L. FISk, The Last Article about the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the 
Failure of Textualism, 33 HAR.v. J. ON LEGIS. 35 (1996) (pension law); Philip P. Frickey, Con­
gressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 
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found that the new textualism has failed to yield greater determi­
nacy in even a single area of law; some of the articles have, surpris­
ingly, found less predictability among judges once an area of law is 
new textualized.152 
There is a third reason, not offered in the Tanner Lectures but 
suggested by Scalia elsewhere, why the Court might avoid openly 
normative choices in statutory cases. Before presenting this third 
argument, the general problem of normativity needs to be explored. 
VI. THE PROBLEM OF NORMATIVITY 
Scalia maintains that the Court must apply statutes as written, 
without flinching. This severe positivism was not the goal of the 
framers, was not written into the Constitution, was not the practice 
of early American courts, and has not been the practice of Ameri­
can courts in this century. Legal method has been practical rather 
than dogmatic, contextual as well as textual, and normative more 
than neutral.153 Has legal method been improperly conceived? 
Should norms be thoroughly absent in the enterprise of statutory 
interpretation? The proper interpretation in Holy Trinity Church, 
in the opinion of most, involves precepts that are normative as well 
as semantic. Brewer invoked the idea of a Christian Nation to in­
form his reading of the statute, its legislative history, and purpose. 
Tribe's comment on the Tanner Lectures emphasizes the rule that 
CAL. L. REv. 1137 {1990) (Indian law); Deborah A. Geier, Commentary: Textualism and Tax 
Cases, 66 TEMP. L. REv. 445 {1993) (tax law); Gwen T. Handelman, Zen and the Art of 
Statutory Construction: A Tax Lawyer's Account of Enlightenment, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 611 
(1991) (tax law); Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional Micromanagement: 
A Potential Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARV. ENVrL. L. REv. 175 (1992) 
(environmental law); Kevin R. Johnson, Responding to the "Litigation Explosion": The Plain 
Meaning of Executive Branch Primacy over Immigration, 71 N.C. L. REv. 413 {1993) (immi­
gration law); Livingston, supra note 149 (tax law); Mank, supra note 116 (environmental 
law); C. Robert Morris, Bankrupt Fantasy: The Site of Missing Words and the Order of Illu­
sory Events, 45 ARK. L. REv. 265 {1992) {bankruptcy law); James P. Nehf, Textualism in the 
Lower Courts: Lessons from Judges Interpreting Consumer Legislation, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 1 
{1994) (consumer law); Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the 
Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1717 {1995) (evidence law); Charles Jordan Tabb & 
Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence 
of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REv. 823 {1991) {bankruptcy law); Michael P. Van 
Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. {forthcoming 1998) (treaty inter­
pretation); Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Rev­
enue Code, 64 N.C. L. REv. 623 {1986) (tax law). A textualist approach is defended in 
Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's 
Bankruptcy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993), published just before BFP was decided. 
152. See Eskridge, supra note 151 (civil rights law); Herz, supra note 151 (environmental 
law); Nehf, supra note 151 (consumer law). For a fascinating case study of this, see Richard J, 
Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund: Searching 
for Plain Meaning in Unambiguous Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 1 {1995). 
153. See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BAs1c 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW {William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. 
Frickey eds., 1994); DENNIS PATIERSON, LAW AND TRUTH {1996) (providing a splendid phil­
osophical exploration of the thesis in the text). 
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one should read a statute so as to avoid constitutional difficulties 
such as reading a general statute to burden religious freedom (p. 
92). My own interpretation is influenced by the rule of lenity, the 
narrow statutory purpose, and the longstanding prior (to 1885) 
practice of freely allowing ministers and other professionals into the 
country. Only Scalia appears to reject all these normative consider­
ations. But in BFP, federalism played the spiritual role for Scalia 
that the Christian Nation did for Brewer in Holy Trinity Church, 
and in MCI the nondelegation idea played the tiebreaking role for 
Scalia that the rule of lenity does for me in Holy Trinity Church.154 
Thus, it appears that norms are not absent from Scalia's interpreta­
tion of statutes; he is merely influenced by different norms. This 
cannot be surprising. Interpretation is always, even if uncon­
sciously, normative -- even the most scrupulously neutral deci­
sionmaker reads the evidence through the lens of her own 
preconceptions.155 
Return to the Case of the Wandering Basketball Player and the 
question of whether the application of Rule 12A, Section IX( c) re­
quires his suspension from the next game. Reread the rule156 and 
consider the following scenarios in which a basketball player leaves 
the bench during a fight under the basket: 
1. The player jumps off the bench and joins the fight. 
2. The player jumps off the bench, runs over to the fight, but does not 
join the fight. 
3. The player leaves the bench and wanders in mid-court, making no 
further move toward the fight. 
4. The player leaves the bench and moves as far away from the fight 
as possible, lest he be tempted to join it. 
5. The player leaves the bench because he needs to use the restroom, 
which is behind the bleachers and well away from the fight. 
6. The fight spreads, and two players end up brawling in front of the 
bench. One player starts to choke the other viciously, and no offi­
cial is nearby. The choked player passes out, and the attacking 
player continues choking. A third player leaves the bench and pre­
vents further choking. 
All of these variations are within the apparent plain meaning of 
Rule 12, Section IX(c). Should they all trigger the suspension? 
The core violation is scenario 1. This was precisely the scenario 
that triggered adoption of the rule in 1994 and is one where the 
bench-clearing conduct is truly dangerous for the players, the refer­
ees, and the fans. The antifighting purpose of the Rule all but re-
154. See supra note 146. For connections between the nondelegation idea and the rule of 
lenity, see Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SuP. CT. REv. 345. 
155. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 
609 (1990) (reviewing the hermeneutics literature). 
156. See supra note 1. 
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quires its application here even if nowhere else, and the NBA has 
invoked the rule in these circumstances. Scenario 2 is only slightly 
removed from the core violation, for the player's behavior strongly 
risks escalating the fight, which is the mischief the rule prophylacti­
cally seeks to prevent. 
At the other end of the spectrum, scenario 5 strikes me as no 
less a violation of the letter of the rule but lies completely outside 
its spirit: the bathroom scenario is far from the core activity the 
rule was designed to regulate, poses virtually no danger of escalat­
ing the fight, has never been the basis of an NBA suspension (that I 
know of), and carries no normative taint from the perspective of 
society or the NBA. Scenario 6 is within the antifighting spirit as 
well as the letter of the rule, but would, in my view, be exempt 
because the rule-abridging conduct is justified by the larger princi­
ple of saving life or preventing serious injury.157 Note here that a 
textualist could follow my application of the rule to scenarios 5 and 
6. Scalia himself has said that a statutory text need not be applied 
to de minimis violations (scenario 5) or to situations where its appli­
cation would be absurd (scenario 6).158 How Scalia himself or any 
other new textualist would apply these precepts to my variations is, 
however, as unpredictable as it would be normative.159 
The hard cases are scenarios 3 and 4. I am agnostic as to 
whether suspension is appropriate for the player in scenario 4. As 
to scenario 3, the Ewing case, I would interpret the rule to require 
suspension. Although Ewing was within the letter of the rule, his 
was not the core case that gave rise to the rule, and according to 
Linda Silberman the NBA had never suspended a player for leaving 
the bench and wandering at mid-court. Critical for me, however, is 
157. Obviously, scenario 6 can be made much more difficult, as by leaving open the possi­
bility that referees were nearby and could have stopped the choking. But it's my 
hypothetical! 
158. See Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231-23 
(1992) (Scalia, J.) (asserting that de minimis exceptions to statutory rules are valid, so long as 
they do not undermine policy of statute); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 
527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (asserting that judges must rewrite stat­
utory texts where the plain meaning applied to the facts is absurd); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, 
Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 324 n.2 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (assert­
ing that it is absurd to apply a statute requiring inspection of ovens for flames when the oven 
is electric). 
159. Thus, a new textualist could find scenario 5 a de minimis violation and hence exempt 
from Rule 12A, Section IX(c)'s automatic penalty, or he could say it is not de minimis, re­
serving that kind of exemption to situations where, for example, a player accidently falls off 
the bench and onto the floor. In that case, the text would probably not be violated because 
the rule only applies when the player fails to "remain in the immediate vicinity of the bench." 
What "immediate vicinity" means should depend on where the fight is taking place. 
Likewise, a new textualist could find it absurd to apply the rule to scenario 6, where 
human life or limb might be lost if the player did not act, or he could refuse to do so, reserv­
ing the absurdity exception for those cases where an act in violation of Rule 12A, Section 
IX(c) is required by law or other NBA Rules. 
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that leaving the bench and going as far as mid-court does create an 
enhanced risk of violence on the court: players from the other team 
as well as Ewing's team would be more tempted to leave their re­
spective benches. I concede that Ewing's case is a hard case. En­
forcing the rule against Ewing risks overenforcing the prophylactic 
antifighting norm (Silberman's concern), but failing to enforce the 
Rule risks underenforcing the norm (my concern). The NBA rules 
against fighting, throwing elbows, and unnecessary contact all re­
flect a strong policy against on-court violence or even the possibility 
of violence.160 The NBA's position is unimpeachable. If there is a 
risk of error, I would err on the side of overenforcing this particular 
norm if I were advising the Commissioner.161 
Probably concurring with my result in scenario 3, Scalia would 
in theory object to my consideration of the background of the rule, 
its overall purpose, the risks of over- versus underenforcement, and 
prior NBA practice. But the jurist doth protest too much. Compar­
ing Scalia's theory, as articulated in the Tanner Lectures, with his 
practice as demonstrated in his analysis of actual cases, yields this 
contrast: the former emphasize the mechanical role of judges as 
passive law finders whose neutrality can be assured by proper meth­
odology, while the latter reveal an active law maker whose method­
ology bursts with discretionary choices informed by normativity. 
There is a bit of David Brewer lurking within Nino Scalia,162 and I 
originally thought the vehemence of the Tanner Lectures was 
Scalia's effort to closet or simply deny his Breweresque tendencies. 
On reflection, I think the disconnect between lecture and prac­
tice reflects a broader problem facing judges generally and the 
Supreme Court in particular. The Court believes its legitimacy rests 
160. NBA Rule 12A, Section VII( d)(6) requires a technical foul to be assessed for throw­
ing an elbow or "any attempted physical act with no contact involved." NBA OPERATIONS 
DEPT., supra note 1, at 42. Rule 12A, Section VIII requires that technical fouls will be auto­
matically imposed against a player or coach for fighting, the offender will be ejected from the 
game, and the Commissioner may (!) suspend and fine the offender. See id. at 41. 
"[U]nnecessary" contact with another player constitutes a "flagrant foul - penalty l," which 
under Rule 12B, Section IV(a) entitles the other team to two free throws and possession of 
the basketball. Id. at 44. "[U]nnecessary and excessive" contact constitutes a "flagrant foul 
- penalty 2," which entitles the other team to two free throws and possession of the basket­
ball and requires ejection of the fouling player. Id. Rule 12B also requires that ordinary 
fouls must be assessed for all sorts of minor contact, even when unintentional. See id at 42-
44. 
161. Not being the Commissioner, I would defer to his judgment in the actual Ewing case; 
if Stem believed Ewing's conduct really was outside the rule's purpose, I would not interfere 
with that judgment. 
162. See generally George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 
YALE L.J. 1297 (1990) (theological roots of much of the jurist's philosophy). For a concrete 
example, Brewer's "Soliloquy on a Christian Nation" in Holy Trinity Church finds a parallel 
in Scalia's "Ode to Blue Collar White Guys" which closes his analytically powerful dissent 
against voluntary affirmative action in Johnson v. Santa Clara County Transportation Agency, 
480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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upon a public perception or agreement that most of what the Court 
does is neutral, technical, even mechanical. So long as the Court 
does not disturb current consensus and political equilibrium on im­
portant public law issues, it will in fact be seen as neutral. But the 
Court is always tempted to be critical or provocative on some issues 
(civil rights during the Warren Court, federalism today), and some 
of the framers expected the Court to mitigate "partial and unjust 
laws," at least to protect common law or constitutional values. 
When the Court is being provocative, or politically incorrect, it 
needs the cover of neutrality. Because the Court needs to be per­
ceived as neutral especially when it is being provocative, it gener­
ally needs to avoid the appearance of normativity. That is why one 
will almost never hear a Supreme Court justice concede in public 
that the Court makes judgment calls, loads the dice in statutory 
cases through substantive canons, and has discretion to influence 
public policy. Scalia is the most politically incorrect of justices and, 
for that reason of interest as well as reasons of principle, the one 
most concerned with presenting a neutral image. But as he admit­
ted, once and never thereafter, in a judicial opinion, "I am not so 
naive (nor do I think our forbears were) as to be unaware that 
judges in a real sense 'make' law. But they make it as judges make 
it, which is to say as though they were 'finding' it - discerning what 
the law is, rather than decreeing what it is today changed to, or what 
it will tomorrow be."163 
The Tanner Lectures can be read as a manifesto for such an "as­
though" philosophy of statutory interpretation: the new textualism 
is a potentially objective method and vocabulary for solidifying the 
Court's reputation as a protector of the rule of law, and the objec­
tivity and credibility it creates, or gives the illusion of creating, will 
protect the Court when it confronts rather than acquiesces in the 
current political equilibrium. That judges say and perhaps believe 
this, however, must not deter the unaffiliated academic from insist­
ing that what the judges do remains normative rather than mechani­
cal, . pragmatic instead of theoretical, and contextual as well as 
textual. 
CONCLUSION: WHAT THE SUPREME COURT OUGHT TO BE 
DOING IN STATUTORY CASES 
Textualism is, alas, an unknown ideal. The new textualism is 
probably not the salvation of statutory interpretation, which can 
best be understood and appreciated as a contextual, pragmatic, and 
normative as well as textual, formalist, and positive enterprise. This 
163. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) {Scalia, J., concur­
ring in the judgment) {offering a reason why Article Ill's grant of "judicial Power" does not 
allow the Court leeway to make its decisions prospective only). 
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approach is explicated in an article Phil Frickey and I wrote on 
practical reasoning in statutory interpretation and developed fur­
ther by each of us in subsequent work.164 Uie practical reasoning 
approach that we found in Supreme Court cases and that has 
proven robust over time is well-exemplified by the jurisprudence of 
Justices Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter in particular, but also by 
several opinions by Justice Scalia, especially his analytically spectac­
ular dissent in the Case of the Used Gun.165 What the best opin­
ions, and the most judicious approaches, have in common is hard­
hitting and candid analysis of a variety of legal sources for figuring 
out what the text means - the language of the statute and its statu­
tory context, legislative history (for all but Scalia, of course), statu­
tory purpose, canonical policies, the evolution of the statute, and 
practical consequences. While a practical reasoning approach is 
more contextually inclined and less mechanical than the approach 
defended in the Tanner Lectures, it is no less constrained, contrary 
to Scalia's argument in those lectures. Referring one final time to 
the Case of the Wandering Basketball Player, consider some gen­
eral lessons from a practical reasoning approach: 
1. The Primacy of Statutory Text. All major theories of statu­
tory interpretation consider the statutory text primary. The plain 
meaning of a text as applied to a set of facts is the focal point for 
attention, whether one is a textualist, intentionalist, or pragmatic 
interpreter of statutes. For any of these, there must be a compelling 
reason to derogate from the meaning the words would convey to an 
ordinary speaker or reader. Thus, I am confident that the large ma­
jority of judges would agree with Scalia and me, and disagree with 
Linda Silberman and Ronald Dworkin, that Rule 12A, Section 
IX( c) was properly applied to Patrick Ewing. Text primacy ought 
not mean text fetishism, however, especially when the texts are nor­
mative, as they are with statutes. Few interpreters would suspend 
164. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. R.Ev. 321 (1990); see also EsKRIDGE, supra note 17, ch. 2; Araiza, 
supra note 151; Scallen, supra note 151; Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory 
Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1073 (1992). 
165. I join the chorus of praise for Justice Scalia's classic dissenting opinion in Smith v. 
United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Lawrepce M. Solan, 
Leaming Our Limits: The Decline of Textualism in Statutory Cases, 1997 Wis. L. R.Ev. 235, 
270-75. Scalia's persuasive approach to a sentence-enhancement statute was essentially and 
correctly followed by the Court in Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995). Other instruc­
tive, hard-hitting, and pragmatically as well as linguistically keen opinions include California 
Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 832, 842 
(1997) (Scalia, J., concurring); Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enters., 117 S. Ct. 660 (1997) 
(Scalia, J.); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), 116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996) (Scalia, J.); Blanchard v. Ber­
geron, 489 U.S. 87, 97 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and in judgment); Pierce v. Under­
wood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988) (Scalia, J.); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 318-23 
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Sometimes, Scalia's exchanges 
with other justices produce excellent opinions on either side of a hard issue. See Babbitt v. 
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
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Ewing if he had left the bench to save a life (scenario 6) or taken a 
restroom break (scenario 5), not because the text cannot literally 
apply to those circumstances, but because the text cannot reason­
ably apply, in light of the policy of the Rule (scenario 5) or other 
important goals (scenario 6). There is no telling how a new textual­
ist would respond to these cases, but my guess is that most would 
agree with my resolutions. 
2. Constrained Evolution. Tue Tanner Lectures scoff at the idea 
that statutory meaning might change over time, common law style 
(p. 21-22), but the Case of the Wandering Basketball Player illus­
trates how this is so, wholly consistent with a rule of law regime. To 
begin with, judges should defer to agency interpretations of statutes 
they are charged with enforcing, unless the interpretations are 
clearly wrong. Tue same precept surely would apply for the benefit 
of the NBA Commissioner. Thus, if I were a judge believing, as I 
do, that Ewing should have been suspended for violating the rule, I 
should still defer to the Commissioner if he determined that the 
rule should not be applied to Ewing's case because the mid-court 
wandering posed no danger to the antifighting policy. One can de­
bate whether there is any play in this particular rule, but it is clear 
that some rules have fuzzy edges that allow administrators to adopt 
one interpretation early in the statute's history, and a different one 
later on. This is the core case of statutory evolution. Most new 
textualists would not allow an agency this degree of latitude, which 
Tom Merrill persuasively maintains is a lamentable feature of the 
new textualist philosophy.166 
Consider another example of statutory evolution: path depen­
dence. Assume that a new textualist thinks Rule 12A, Section 
IX(c) should require suspension in both scenarios 3 (wandering 
mid-court) and 4 (going to the other end of the court). But assume 
that the courts authoritatively hold scenario 3 exempt from the sus­
pension. Not only would the new textualist be bound as a matter of 
stare decisis to scenario 3, but if scenario 4 arose, the honest textu­
alist would probably be constrained by precedent to prevent sus­
pension there as well - unless she can overrule or persuasively 
narrow the earlier precedent. . 
Finally, as context changes, the application of Rule 12A, Section 
IX( c) can be expected to change, even if the terms of the Rule do 
not. If New York City after the Ewing case enacted an ordinance 
barring application of this NBA Rule so long as the bench-clearing 
athlete is more than fifteen feet from any altercation, the NBA 
Commissioner would be justified in cutting back generally on the 
application of the plain meaning of Rule 12A, Section IX(c). To 
166. See Merrill, supra note 14; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Execu­
tive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992). 
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take a more interesting variation, assume that the NBA itself 
adopted a new rule prohibiting players from leaving the bench dur­
ing a game to use the restroom but without specifying a penalty. 
Such a rule change would require me to rethink my earlier refusal 
to suspend a player under the circumstances of scenario 5. The rel­
evant changed context might also be factual. My disinclination to 
apply the rule to scenario 5 would also be turned around if the 
NBA reliably found, to my surprise, that players leaving the bench 
for the bathroom in tense or fight situations were likely to rile fans, 
thereby increasing the possibility of fights among fans or between 
fans and players. 
Contrary to Scalia, statutory evolution is not the same as willful 
judges forcing their personal views onto statutes, any more than the 
new textualism is willful judges forcing regulatory statutes into pro­
crustean beds. The willful judge will tamper with statutes whatever 
the methodology, and dynamic statutory interpretation as a norma­
tive proposition means that statutes ought to change in an orderly 
common law way, in response to new circumstances and new legal 
developments. 
3. Judicial Humility and Critical Responsibility. The humble 
judge is genuinely interested in the background as well as the text 
of the statute she is construing: Why was it adopted? What were 
their assumptions? How did its authors use language? With what 
terms of art were they familiar? It is relevant to the interpretation 
of Rule 12A, Section IX(c) that the NBA adopted the measure af­
ter a serious bench-clearing brawl between the Knicks and the Bulls 
in 1994, that the brawl was considered embarrassing to the league 
and dangerous for the players, and that the mandatory suspension 
was deliberately chosen in order to send a strong signal that fighting 
would not be tolerated and that the conditions for fighting were to 
be avoided. Judicial humility is the main reason that I hesitate to 
follow Scalia in advocating a firm "never look at legislative history" 
rule. Reading the legislative history puts the judge better in touch 
with the values, vocabulary, and policy choices of the authors of the 
statute - just as The Federalist does for the framers of the Consti­
tution. The humility owed by judges is why Souter's position is the 
better one in BFP: Congress was aware of the federalism issues, 
resolved the fraudulent conveyance rule to trump state law, and is 
owed deference in its resolution. 
Because judges are constitutional as well as statutory interpret­
ers, they have some critical as well as agency responsibility. Ac­
cording to Federalist 78, critique was the reason for judicial 
independence. This is a responsibility to be exercised rarely, but 
when exercised it should be open and naked, so that if the judge is 
wrong she alone will bear responsibility for the error. Consider an 
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example: If the NBA Commissioner suspended a player for rescu­
ing another player from being choked (scenario 6) and I were a 
judge in a position to review the issue as a matter of rule interpreta­
tion, I would reverse - notwithstanding the rule's plain meaning, 
notwithstanding the player's violating the antifighting goal, and 
notwithstanding the humility I am supposed to have and the defer­
ence I would ordinarily show to the Commissioner's judgment. I 
would reverse because the suspension is at odds with the fundamen­
tal disparity between the antifighting policy and the preservation of 
human life. I should like to think that Scalia would agree, as a mat­
ter of interpretation. 
